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Abstract
Most home mortgages in the United States are ￿xed-rate loans with an embedded pre-
payment option. When long-term rates decline, the e⁄ective duration of mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) falls due to heightened re￿nancing expectations. I show that these changes
in MBS duration function as large-scale shocks to the quantity of interest rate risk that
must be borne by professional bond investors. I develop a simple model in which the risk
tolerance of bond investors is limited in the short run, so these ￿ uctuations in MBS du-
ration generate signi￿cant variation in bond risk premia. Speci￿cally, bond risk premia
are high when aggregate MBS duration is high. The model o⁄ers an explanation for why
long-term rates may appear to be ￿excessively sensitive￿to movements in short rates and
explains how changes in MBS duration act as a positive-feedback mechanism that ampli￿es
interest rate volatility. I ￿nd strong support for these predictions in the time series of US
government bond returns.
￿I thank seminar participants at the Boston University, Federal Reserve Board, the Copenhagen Business
School FRIC￿ 13 Conference, as well as John Campbell, Anna Cieslak, Robin Greenwood, Arvind Krishnamurthy,
Lasse Pedersen, Erik Sta⁄ord, Jeremy Stein, Larry Summers, Adi Sunderam, and Dimitri Vayanos for helpful
comments. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for many helpful suggestions. I gratefully acknowledge funding
from the Harvard Business School Division of Research.1 Introduction
A distinguishing feature of bond markets in the United States is the prominent role of ￿xed-rated
home mortgages. Most ￿xed-rate mortgages issued in the US grant the borrower the right to
prepay the loan at any time without penalty. When long-term interest rates decline, the option
to prepay the mortgage and re￿nance at the current interest rate moves towards the money.
Because lenders expect to be repaid sooner, the e⁄ective duration of outstanding mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) falls￿ i.e., the sensitivity of MBS prices to changes in long-term yields
declines. Conversely, as long-term interest rates rise, the prepayment option moves out of the
money and the e⁄ective duration of MBS rises. To quote a Wall Street adage, this means that a
mortgage-backed security ￿goes up like a 2 year bond￿when rates fall and ￿goes down like a 6
year￿when rates rise. More formally, the negative relationship between price and yield is convex
for a noncallable bond. By contrast, the price-yield relation for callable bonds such as MBS is
typically concave￿ a feature that bond investors call ￿negative convexity.￿
Aggregate mortgage re￿nancing activity varies signi￿cantly over time. Because re￿nancing
entails large ￿nancial and non￿nancial costs, households typically follow a trigger rule, re￿nancing
only when their option is su¢ ciently far in the money. Thus, depending on the past path of
mortgage rates, there are times when many households move from being far from re￿nancing to
being close to re￿nancing and vice versa. I argue that the resulting changes in aggregate MBS
duration act as massive supply shocks to the total quantity of interest rate risk that must be
borne by investors in the broader bond market. Because these shifts in bond market duration are
large relative to bond investors￿risk tolerance, they have a signi￿cant impact on equilibrium term
premium￿ i.e., on the expected return on long-term default-free bonds over short-term default-
free bonds. In summary, time-variation in aggregate mortgage re￿nancing has a signi￿cant e⁄ect
on the pricing of interest rate risk throughout the US ￿xed income market and, in particular,
has a large impact on US Treasury yields.
Why do shifts in expected household mortgage re￿nancing a⁄ect the aggregate amount of
interest rate risk that bond market investors must bear? First, household borrowers only gradu-
ally exercise their prepayment options following a decline in prevailing mortgage rates. Second,
household borrowers do not alter their bond holdings to hedge their time-varying interest rate ex-
posure. That is, households do not adjust their asset portfolios to o⁄set the time-varying interest
rate risk they are bearing on the liability side. The gradual response of mortgage prepayments
to changes in mortgage rates and the lack of household hedging means that there are times when
households are bearing more or less interest rate risk. Conversely, there are times when bond
investors are bearing less or more risk. Thus, shifting re￿nancing expectations generate a form
of aggregate market congestion: there are times when most households are e⁄ectively borrowing
long term and other times when most are borrowing short term. If the risk-bearing capacity of
professional bond investors is limited in the short run, then the term premium must adjust to
induce investors to bear these risks.
The sheer size of the MBS market within the US bond market plays a crucial role in this
story. Bond markets have witnessed several MBS duration supply shocks that are larger than
1the shift in duration induced by the Federal Reserve￿ s Quantitative Easing policies from 2008 to
2012. For instance, there have been several occasions when the quarterly change in MBS duration
was equivalent to a $1 trillion increase (in 2012 dollars) in the supply of 10-year Treasury notes,
with a corresponding reduction in the supply of short-term T-bills. By way of comparison, the
quarterly new-issue supply of 10-year Treasury notes in 2012 was roughly $65 billion. Thus,
past shifts in MBS duration have arguably been very large relative to the risk tolerance of bond
market arbitrageurs.
I develop a simple model of this mortgage convexity mechanism. The model has the following
key ingredients. First, expectations of future household mortgage re￿nancing vary over time,
which induces shifts in the e⁄ective duration of household mortgage borrowing. Second, aggregate
bond risks are priced by risk-averse, specialized bond investors as in Vayanos and Vila (2009).
This ensures that demand curves for aggregate bond risks slope downward, so the term premium
must adjust to induce investors to absorb the aggregate supply of bond duration. Speci￿cally,
the model predicts that measures of aggregate bond market duration, which derive most of
their power from variation in MBS duration, should positively predict bond excess returns.
Furthermore, since shocks to MBS duration are fairly transient, one would expect ￿ uctuations
in MBS duration to lead to high frequency variation in bond risk premia.
The model shows how negative MBS convexity may contribute to the excess sensitivity of
long-term yields to movements in short rates (Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005)) and, more
generally, to the excess volatility of long-term yields (Shiller (1979)). Excess sensitivity re￿ ects
what might be called a ￿MBS duration spiral.￿An initial shock to the short rate directly raises
long yields due to the expectations hypothesis. The rise in long yields raises the duration of
MBS. The term premium must rise in order to induce risk-averse bond investors to bear the
larger aggregate quantity of interest rate risk. The resulting rise in yields further raises MBS
duration, which further raises the term premium, and so on. Thus, the fact that MBS duration is
increasing in long yields gives rise to a positive-feedback channel that generates excess sensitivity
and excess volatility. The model also suggests that this positive-feedback mechanism is strongest
when the mortgage market is on a ￿re￿nancing cli⁄￿ ￿ i.e., when a small movement in long rates
will signi￿cantly impact re￿nancing behavior and, hence, MBS duration. The model therefore
predicts that excess sensitivity and volatility should be most pronounced when the MBS market
is more negatively convex.
I also show that an MBS duration shock should have a larger e⁄ect on the expected excess
returns of long-term bonds than on those of intermediate-term bonds. This is a natural conse-
quence of the fact that an MBS duration shock raises the current duration risk premium in bond
markets. However, since these shocks are transient, shocks to MBS duration have a humped-
shaped e⁄ect on the yield curve and the forward rate curve. The e⁄ects of a supply shock on
yields￿ which equals the e⁄ect on the bond￿ s average returns over its lifetime￿ will be greater
for intermediate term bonds than for long-term bonds when the supply shock is expected to be
short-lived. That is, a shock to MBS duration increases the curvature of the yield curve. This
suggests that transient shocks to MBS duration may account for some of the predictive power
of the Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) factor which picks up time-variation in the curvature of the
2yield curve and is useful for forecasting transitory variation in bond returns.
I ￿nd strong support for these predictions in US interest rate data between 1989 and 2011.
Measures of MBS duration are strong predictors of excess government bond returns. And they
appear to contain information that is not re￿ ected in traditional forecasting variables based on
the current shape of the yield curve. My analysis of the time signature of these e⁄ects indicates
that shocks to MBS duration have a transitory impact on term premia which largely dissipates
over the next 6 to 12 months. As predicted, shocks to MBS duration have a hump-shaped e⁄ect
on the yield and forward rate curves. I also ￿nd that the excess sensitivity of long rates to short
rates is more pronounced when the MBS market is on a re￿nancing cli⁄￿ i.e., when a move in
long rates has a larger impact on aggregate MBS duration. Lastly, I ￿nd that option-implied
volatility of long yields is higher when the MBS market is more negatively convex.
It is worth noting that I lack a good instrument for MBS duration that would allow me
to cleanly identify the demand curve for interest rate risk. As a result, I rely on predictive
regressions that provide indirect evidence consistent with the view that shifts in MBS duration
trace out a downward-sloping demand for interest rate risk. These return forecasting regressions
are analogous to a regression of prices (term premia) on quantities (duration supply). Thus, I
take considerable care to address several natural concerns raised by this indirect approach.
To begin, I control for an exhaustive set of factors that are thought to impact term premia to
address concerns that my forecasting results are driven by an omitted variable. I then provide
a host of further indirect evidence that is consistent with the MBS story, but that would not be
predicted by alternative explanations for my ￿ndings. First, I show that the return forecasting
power of MBS duration has grown signi￿cantly over time as MBS markets have grown relative
to the rest of the US bond market. Second, I show that shifts in MBS duration have far more
forecasting power for US bond returns than for foreign bond returns. Third, I show that shifts in
MBS duration impact the spreads between corporate bonds, interest rate swaps, and Treasuries
in precisely the way that one would expect if MBS investors were using Treasuries and swaps￿
but not corporate bonds￿ to hedge variation in MBS duration. Collectively, these additional
￿ndings provide further support for my story emphasizing shifts in MBS duration.
Bond investors often invoke shifts in MBS duration and the portfolio-hedging ￿ ows they
trigger when explaining large movements in long-term interest rates. Many MBS investors
delta-hedge the time-varying duration of MBS: if there is a drop in long rates that raises mort-
gage re￿nancing expectations and lowers MBS duration, these investors buy more long-term
Treasuries￿ ￿nanced by selling some short-term T-bills￿ in order to maintain their prior asset
duration. Given the prominence that these dynamics receive in practitioner commentary, their
relative absence from the literature on the term structure of interest rates is somewhat surpris-
ing. The handful of exceptions includes Fernald, Keane, and Mosser (1994), Kambu and Mosser
(2001), Perli and Sack (2003), Duarte (2008), and Malkhozov, Mueller, Vedolin, and Venter
(2013). Kambu and Mosser (2001), Perli and Sack (2003), and Duarte (2008) each argue that
these hedging ￿ ows impact interest rate volatility, whereas the primary focus of my paper is to
investigate the impact of MBS duration on the equilibrium term structure of yields and term
3premia.1 In contemporaneous work, Malkhozov et all (2013) also explore the impact of MBS
duration on excess returns. Their study places more emphasis on the implications of MBS hedg-
ing for interest rate volatility whereas I am primarily interested in understanding the pricing
implications of these hedging ￿ ows.
The ideas in this paper connect to several broader strands of prior research. First, the idea
that supply and demand e⁄ects can have important consequences in bond markets is central to
a number of recent papers, including Vayanos and Vila (2009), Greenwood and Vayanos (2010,
2012), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011, 2012), and Gagnon et al (2011). Important
precursors to this recent work include Tobin (1958) and Modigliani and Sutch (1966). This
literature has featured prominently in the ￿portfolio balance e⁄ect￿interpretation of the Federal
Reserve￿ s recent Quantitative Easing policies, in which it is typically argued that Fed purchases of
long-term assets reduce bond risk premia. Second, there is a vast literature devoted to forecasting
the excess returns on long-term bonds. Important contributions here include Fama and Bliss
(1987), Campbell and Shiller (1991), and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005). Third, a variety of
papers have documented excess sensitivity including Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002), Gurkaynak,
Sack, and Swanson (2005), and Hanson and Stein (2012). Fourth, a number of papers have
argued that long-term yields are excessively volatile including Shiller (1979), Perli and Sack
(2003), and Duarte (2008). Finally, a growing literature, including Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and
Vigneron (2007), Greenwood and Vayanos (2013), and Vayanos and Vila (2009), explores the
implications of limited arbitrage in ￿xed income markets.
The plan for the paper is as follows. Section 2 clari￿es why shifts in MBS duration matter
and develops a stylized model that generates several novel empirical predictions. In Section 3,
I ￿nd strong support for these predictions in the time series of US government bond returns.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Shocks to MBS duration
Suppose a large number of households announce that in six months time they will repay their
existing mortgages at par and will take out new mortgages at the prevailing mortgage rate. And
suppose for simplicity that this commitment to re￿nance in six months is binding. Suddenly,
from the perspective of investors who own the existing mortgages, the mortgages behave just
like short-term bonds, so mortgage holders are bearing less interest rate risk. And over the
following six months, households are bearing signi￿cantly more interest rate risk￿ they will be
worse o⁄ if rates rise and better o⁄ if rates fall. In order to hedge this interest rate exposure,
households could initially sell some long-term Treasuries with the intention of buying them back
1Perli and Sack (2003) show that MBS hedging impacts swaption-implied yield volatility. Duarte (2008) also
￿nds that MBS hedging forecasts high future realized volatility which suggests that hedging ￿ ows do not simply
impact interest rate option prices, but also impact the underlying bond yields.
4in six months.2 However, due to a variety of frictions, costs, or a lack of ￿nancial sophistication,
households do not hedge their time-varying exposure to interest rate risk. So, on net, there is a
temporary reduction in the amount of interest rate risk that ￿xed income investors must bear
in equilibrium. And if the risk-bearing capacity of bond investors is limited, the expected excess
return on long-term bonds must fall in order to equate the supply and demand for bonds.
In practice, households do not enter into binding agreements to re￿nance. Instead, household
re￿nancing behavior is gradual, so shocks to long-term interest rates alter expected mortgage
re￿nancing. Critically, I assume households do not hedge their interest rate exposure￿ i.e.,
households do not alter their bond holdings to hedge the time-varying interest rate risk they are
assuming on the liability side of their balance sheets. This plausible assumption is the key friction
that generates time-varying risk sharing between household borrowers and bond investors and,
thus, shifts in aggregate bond market duration.
For instance, when future mortgage re￿nancings are expected to be high, households are
e⁄ectively borrowing shorter term and, hence, are bearing more interest rate risk￿ i.e., households
are exposed to the risk that they will re￿nance at a less advantageous rate. Conversely, when
expected re￿nancings are low, households are e⁄ectively borrowing longer term, so investors are
bearing more interest rate risk. The total quantity of interest rate risk borne in the economy
remains unchanged: there is a single long-term asset, namely housing, which is going to be
￿nanced long-term at some interest rate. Instead, what varies is the amount of interest rate
risk that is borne by bond investors as opposed to household borrowers. Shifts in the extent of
aggregate risk sharing between households and investors move the price of interest rate risk￿ i.e.,
the duration risk premium￿ in bond markets.
If the total quantity of interest rate risk in the economy is ￿xed, why do shifts in MBS
duration move bond prices? One natural answer, as in Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron
(2007) is that, while this may be a wash from the perspective of some representative household
(e.g., when the representative household is about to re￿nance, she is taking more interest rate risk
on the liability side but is exposed to less interest rate risk on her bond holdings), the change
in the quantity of bond risk still looms large from the standpoint of a delegated investment
manager who specializes in bond markets. If this manager is forced to invest a large fraction
of her own wealth in the bond fund￿ e.g., to mitigate agency problems￿ then the manager will
perceive an increase in the total quantity of risk. Thus, risks that are idiosyncratic from an
aggregate perspective may be priced because of the large undiversi￿ed exposures of specialized
intermediaries who are the marginal buyers of bonds.3
It is crucial to distinguish here between the interest rate risk of MBS and MBS model risk.
Interest rate risk derives from the fact that the value of MBS depends on the level of rates,
assuming that household prepayment behavior is a known deterministic function of rates. By
2The household would invest the proceeds in short-term bills for 6 months. If households were to hedge in this
way, their desire to short long-term bonds would perfectly o⁄set the temporary decline in mortgage duration.
3A second answer is to think about an overlapping generations setting where households borrow when young
and lend when old. Since the young are bearing less interest rate risk when re￿nancing expectations are low, this
means that the old are bearing more risk which will impact equilibrium term premia. In this telling, time-varying
risk-sharing between the old and young induces time-variation in bond risk premia.
5contrast, model risk derives from the fact that household prepayment behavior is not a known
function of interest rates. Instead, it is sometimes di¢ cult to predict how prepayments will
respond to changes in rates. This paper focuses on the time-varying interest rate risk of the
aggregate MBS market. The key insights are that household prepayment behavior is gradual
and that households do not hedge their time-varying interest rate exposure. Thus, the total
quantity of interest rate risk borne by professional bond investors can vary over time even if
prepayment behavior is a deterministic function of the path of rates. As a result, the time-
varying quantity of interest-rate risk emphasized here should be distinguished from MBS model
risk as analyzed by Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2007).
2.2 Stylized model with short- and long-term bonds
The main predictions can be illustrated using a simple dynamic model that features only short-
and long-term bonds at each date t. The expected excess return on long-term bonds over short-
term bonds is the only endogenous variable at each date. The Internet Appendix extends the
model to allow for multiple bond maturities.
There is a set of risk-averse arbitrageurs (e.g., ￿xed income hedge funds, ￿xed income dealers,
etc.) who price interest rate risk in bond markets. Assume these investors extend ￿xed-rate,
prepayable mortgages to households and also own some noncallable bonds (e.g., Treasuries)￿
i.e., assume that the same arbitrageurs are marginal buyers in both MBS and Treasury markets.
The key idea is that these arbitrageurs are specialists who are heavily exposed to risks speci￿c
to the bond market. The limited risk-bearing capacity of these investors ensures that, at least
in the short term, demand curves for aggregate bond risk factors slope downward. In particular,
the required return on long-term bonds must rise relative to short-term bonds to induce investors
to bear more interest rate risk.
I assume that, at each date t, arbitrageurs have mean-variance preferences over wealth at
t + 1, with possibly time-varying risk aversion, ￿t. This is the discrete-time analog of Vayanos
and Vila (2009) who work in continuous time. The key idea is that arbitrageurs are concerned
with their interim wealth and, hence, with interest rate risk￿ i.e., the risk that they will have to
sell long-term bonds at a capital loss if interest rates rise tomorrow.
Let rt+1 denote the log return on 1-period riskless bonds between t and t + 1. By de￿nition
rt+1 = y
(1)
t , i.e., the yield on 1-period bonds at time t. I assume an exogenous random process for
the short rate. One can think of this as being pinned down by monetary policy or by a stochastic
short-term storage technology that is in perfectly elastic supply. Thus, from the standpoint of
arbitrageurs at time t, the only relevant uncertainty is about rt+2 = y
(1)
t+1. The log return on
2-period bonds from t to t+1 is r
(2)
t+1 = 2y
(2)
t ￿y
(1)
t+1 = 2y
(2)
t ￿rt+2, so the excess return on 2-period
bonds relative to 1-period bonds is rx
(2)
t+1 = r
(2)
t+1 ￿rt+1 = 2y
(2)
t ￿rt+1 ￿rt+2. Arbitrageurs choose
6their long-term bond holdings bt to solve
max
bt
n
bt ￿ Et[rx
(2)
t+1] ￿ b
2
t ￿ (￿t=2)V art[rx
(2)
t+1]
o
(1)
= max
bt
￿
bt ￿ (2y
(2)
t ￿ rt+1 ￿ Et [rt+2]) ￿ b
2
t ￿ (￿t=2)V art [rt+2]
￿
.
I assume that rt+1 and ￿tV art [rt+2] follow exogenous stochastic processes. Thus, we have
bt(y
(2)
t ) = (￿tV art [rt+2])
￿1 ￿ (2y
(2)
t ￿ rt+1 ￿ Et [rt+2]). (2)
I model the MBS positive-feedback channel in a simple way. Let Qt denote the total dollar
quantity of duration risk that needs to be held by ￿xed income arbitrageurs. In practical terms,
we can identify Qt with the total number of ￿10-year Treasury duration equivalents￿summed
across all US ￿xed income markets. I allow Qt to depend on y
(2)
t : I assume that Qt = Qt(y
(2)
t )
with Q0
t(y
(2)
t ) > 0 to capture the fact that MBS duration is increasing in long-term yields. As
discussed above, Q0
t(y
(2)
t ) > 0 is a property that holds locally due to time-variation in risk sharing
between household mortgage borrowers and bond investors. And the vast size of the MBS market
relative to the broader US bond market ensures that shifts in MBS duration have a signi￿cant
e⁄ect on aggregate bond market duration.
The equilibrium long-term yield must clear the market at each date, i.e., bt(y
(2)
t ) = Qt(y
(2)
t ),
which delivers the following ￿xed-point condition:
y
(2)
t = (rt+1 + Et [rt+2])=2 + (￿t=2)V art [rt+2]Qt(y
(2)
t ): (3)
To ensure that this equilibrium is locally stable, I assume that 1 > (￿t=2)V art [rt+2]Q0
t(y
(2)
t ):
This ensures that a small exogenous shock to y
(2)
t leads to a larger increase in investor demand
for bond duration than in duration supply (i.e., @bt(y
(2)
t )=@y
(2)
t > Q0
t(y)).
The expected excess return on long-term bonds relative to short-term bonds is
E[rx
(2)
t+1] = ￿tV art [rt+2]Qt(y
(2)
t ), (4)
and the yield spread is
y
(2)
t ￿ y
(1)
t = (Et [rt+2] ￿ rt+1)=2 + (￿t=2)V art [rt+2]Qt(y
(2)
t ): (5)
Naturally, in the limiting cases where arbitrageurs are risk neutral (￿t = 0) or have to bear no
interest rate risk (V art [rt+2]Qt(y
(2)
t ) = 0), the expectations hypothesis holds.
2.3 Predictions
2.3.1 Forecasting excess bond returns
The model predicts that measures of aggregate bond market duration, which derive most of their
power from variation in MBS duration, should positively predict bond excess returns.
7Proposition 1 Both the yield spread and aggregate bond market duration, Qt(y
(2)
t ), will posi-
tively forecast excess bond returns. This remains true in a multivariate forecasting regression so
long as ￿tV art [rt+2] varies over time.
Why isn￿ t the slope of the yield curve a su¢ cient statistic for forecasting excess bond returns?
In this simple model, the term spread contains information about both the expected path of future
short rates and term premia, both of which vary over time. Duration measures pertain solely to
the latter and, thus, can improve the forecasting power of regressions that include only the term
spread. Formally, so long as ￿tV art [rt+2] varies over time, both the yield spread and duration will
positively predict excess returns in a multivariate forecasting regression. According to equation
(4), expected returns equal the product of the time-varying quantity of risk, Qt(y
(2)
t ), and the
time-varying price per unit of risk, ￿tV art [rt+2]. Aggregate duration provides an accurate signal
of the quantity of risk. Equation (5) shows that the yield spread contains information about both
the quantity of risk and the price of risk, but it is a noisy indicator of expected returns because
it contains an expectations hypothesis component, (Et [rt+2] ￿ rt+1)=2. Thus, adding Qt(y
(2)
t )
to a regression that contains the term spread can raise the forecasting power, particularly if the
time-series variation in (Et [rt+2] ￿ rt+1)=2 is high.
More generally, the aggregate supply of duration contains valuable information about term
premia that cannot be easily recovered from the yield curve￿ e.g., duration may help to forecast
excess bond returns even controlling for the term spread, the Cochrane Piassezi (2005) factor,
or other simple yield-based proxies for term premia. Nonetheless, it is not my intention to argue
that duration is an unspanned state variable in the sense of Du⁄ee (2011) or Joslin, Priebsch, and
Singleton (2013). In classic term structure approaches, if we know the true model, we can invert
yields to obtain the full set of state variables. An unspanned state variable is a variable that
is useful for forecasting returns but that has (almost) no impact on current yields and cannot
be recovered in this way.4 Speci￿cally, the Internet Appendix shows that I can nest all of my
predictions in an a¢ ne term structure model similar to Vayanos and Vila (2009) in which MBS
duration is a spanned state variable that impacts current yields. Thus, assuming a stationary
data generating process, all the information about future bond returns would be contained in
current yields, and duration would not add any further information.
In practice, however, we do not know the true model generating bond yields. Furthermore,
it seems likely that the true model evolves over time due to changes in the macroeconomy,
the conduct of monetary policy, market structure, and the behavior of market participants.
For instance, below I show that the impact of MBS duration on term premia and bond market
spreads has grown over time, arguably because ￿ uctuations in duration have grown larger relative
to investor risk tolerance. Thus, in practice, it is natural that duration is a useful summary
statistic which contains additional information about future excess bond returns.
4As Du⁄ee (2011) explains, this would arise if the evolution of short-rates under the risk-neutral (pricing)
measure is independent of some variable￿ implying that it has no impact on current yields￿ even though that
variable is relevant for forecasting future short rates under the objective measure. Such a situation could arise if
a variable had o⁄setting e⁄ects on the evolution of future short rates and future term premia￿ e.g., some scary,
bad news which raises future expected term premia but lowers future expected short rates.
82.3.2 Excess sensitivity of long-term rates to short rates
The negative convexity of the US ￿xed income market naturally generates excess sensitivity of
long-term yields to movements in short-term rates. To see this, consider the static case where
y(2) = (r1 + E [r2])=2+(￿=2)V ar[r2]Q
￿
y(2)￿
and consider a change in r1, holding ￿xed all other
parameters including E [r2]. Since 1 > (￿=2)V ar[r2]Q0 ￿
y(2)￿
> 0, we have
@y(2)
@r1
=
1
2
P1
i=0
￿
(￿=2)V ar[r2]Q
0 ￿
y
(2)￿￿i
=
1=2
1 ￿ (￿=2)V ar[r2]Q0 (y(2))
>
1
2
. (6)
This excess sensitivity stems from an ￿MBS duration spiral.￿A small initial shock to the short
rate of dr1 directly raises long-term yields by (1=2)dr1 due to the expectations hypothesis; the rise
in yields extends the duration of MBS, which raises the termpremiumby (1=2)
￿
(￿=2)V ar[r2]Q0 ￿
y(2)￿￿
dr1;
the resulting rise in yields further extends the duration of MBS, which further raises the term
premium by (1=2)
￿
(￿=2)V ar[r2]Q0 ￿
y(2)￿￿2 dr1, and so on.5
The same excess sensitivity point can be made in terms of forward rates. Working with
forward rates allows for cleaner empirical tests since there is no direct expectations hypothesis
term. The forward rate is f(2) = 2y(2) ￿ r1 = E [r2] + ￿V ar[r2]Q(
￿
r1 + f(2)￿
=2). Consider a
change in r1, holding ￿xed all other parameters including E [r2].6 We have
@f(2)
@r1
=
(￿=2)V ar[r2]Q0(y(2))
1 ￿ (￿=2)V ar[r2]Q0 (y(2))
> 0: (7)
Proposition 2 If aggregate bond market duration is increasing in yields (Q0 ￿
y(2)￿
> 0), long-
term yields and forward rates will be excessively sensitive to movements in short-term rates.
Furthermore, both long-term real and nominal rates will exhibit excess sensitivity.
Thus, the model departs from Vayanos and Vila (2009) who assume that Q0 ￿
y(2)￿
< 0￿ i.e.,
that arbitrageurs must hold a lower net-supply of long-term bonds when long-term yields are
high. The assumption that Q0 ￿
y(2)￿
< 0 implies that distant forwards underreact to movements
in short rates. However, as discussed further below, the bulk of the empirical evidence suggests
that distant forwards overreact, not underreact, to movements in short rates.7
5Changes in expected future short rates will also lower risk premia in the model: @y(2)=@E [r2] = @y(2)=@r1 >
1=2￿ i.e., the MBS convexity e⁄ect suggests that FOMC ￿forward guidance￿may impact term premia. Intuitively,
the ampli￿cation mechanism is the same for either an independent change in r1 or E [r2].
6By considering su¢ ciently distant forwards, it is reasonable to assume that expected short rates in the distant
future are insensitive to current short rates￿ i.e., that @E [r2]=@r1 ￿ 0. Of course, even if @E [r2]=@r1 6= 0, we
have @f(2)=@r1 > @E [r2]=@r1, so the excess sensitivity result still carries through.
7Vayanos and Vila (2009) assume that Q0 ￿
y(2)￿
< 0 because it enables their baseline model￿ featuring an
stochastic short rate, no independent supply shocks, and constant arbitrageur risk tolerance￿ to explain why the
term spread forecasts excess bond returns. The intuition is that a rise in short rates￿ which directly raises long
yields and lowers the term spread due to the expectations hypothesis￿ reduces the amount of long bonds that
arbitrageurs must hold and, thus, the term premium. Thus, to jointly explain the forecasting power of the term
spread and excess sensitivity, one may need to entertain a more complicated model where Q
0
t(y
(2)
t ) > 0 and, in
addition to short rate shocks, there are independent shocks to the supply of duration or arbitrageur risk tolerance.
9The model also generates a novel prediction about how the excess sensitivity of long-term
forwards varies over time.
Proposition 3 The excess sensitivity of long-term rates to short rates is more pronounced when
the ￿xed income market is more negatively convex (@2y(2)=@r1@Q0 ￿
y(2)￿
> 0).
2.3.3 Excess volatility of long-term interest rates
The model also has implications for the volatility of long-term yields. Suppose we are at time t
and consider the long-termyield at time t+1: y
(2)
t+1 = (rt+2+Et+1 [rt+3])=2+(￿=2)V ar[rt+3]Q(y
(2)
t+1).
Assume the only uncertainty is about rt+2 + Et+1 [rt+3], so that
y
(2)
t+1 ￿ Et[y
(2)
t+1] ￿
@y(2)
@r1
jy(2)=Et[y
(2)
t+1] ￿ (Et+1 ￿ Et)(rt+2 + rt+3). (8)
Thus, we have
V art[y
(2)
t+1] ￿
 
1=2
1 ￿ (￿=2)V ar[r2]Q0(Et[y
(2)
t+1])
!2
￿ V art [rt+2 + Et+1 [rt+3]]. (9)
Proposition 4 All else equal, long-term interest rate volatility, V art[y
(2)
t+1], is increasing in the
negative convexity of the ￿xed income market, Q0(Et[y
(2)
t+1]).
Excess volatility of long-term rates is a natural corollary of excess sensitivity. However,
the negative convexity of the MBS market acts as a positive-feedback loop that ampli￿es the
e⁄ects of any primitive shock￿ e.g., short-term rate, investor risk tolerance, or bond supply￿
that moves bond yields. Thus, the growth of the MBS market may have led to a secular increase
in excess volatility. However, there is an additional time-series prediction: long rates should be
particularly volatile at times when the MBS market is most negatively convex. Perli and Sack
(2003) and Duarte (2008) develop a similar hypothesis and ￿nd support for it in recent US data.
2.3.4 Allowing for multiple bond maturities
In the Internet Appendix, I extend the model with only short- and long-term bonds to allow
for multiple bond maturities. The extension is a discrete time version of the no-arbitrage term
structure model developed by Vayanos and Vila (2009) and Greenwood and Vayanos (2013). I
add the MBS convexity e⁄ect to this model in a simple fashion: I assume that the aggregate
supply of duration which must be held by arbitrageurs rises when interest rates rise. However, I
assume that these duration shocks dissipate quickly￿ i.e., duration shocks are transitory and are
expected to mean-revert over time. These assumptions are a simple way to capture the dynamics
of MBS duration explained in the paper.
Solving the model, I obtain a discrete-time a¢ ne model of the term structure with two state
variables, the current short rate and the current level of MBS duration, which depends on the
past path of interest rates. The model generates the following predictions:
101. An MBS duration shock raises the current expected excess returns on long-term bonds
over short-term bonds. Furthermore, since MBS duration is expected to quickly revert to
its long-run mean, this e⁄ect is short-lived in expectation.
2. A stronger MBS convexity e⁄ect (i.e., a more negatively convex MBS universe) increases
the sensitivity of long-term yields and forward rates to movements in short rates.
3. A stronger MBS convexity e⁄ect increases the volatility of long-term yields and forwards.
These three results echo those from the simple model presented above. However, the multiple
maturity extension delivers several additional predictions that I can take to the data:
4. An MBS duration shock has a larger e⁄ect on the expected excess returns on longer-term
bonds than on those on intermediate-term bonds. This is a natural consequence of the
fact that an MBS duration shock raises the current duration risk premium: the expected
returns on long duration bonds move more than those on intermediate duration bonds.
5. However, since they are expected to quickly dissipate, shocks to MBS duration have a
humped-shaped e⁄ect on the yield curve and the forward rate curve￿ i.e., a shock to MBS
duration increases the curvature of the yield curve. As in Greenwood and Vayanos (2013),
the e⁄ects of a supply shock on yields￿ which equals the e⁄ect on the bond￿ s average
returns over its lifetime￿ will be greater for intermediate-term bonds than for long-term
bonds when the supply shock is transient.
These two predictions mean that it is impossible to infer whether there was, say, decline in
the duration risk premium simply by asking whether the yield curve ￿ attened as is advocated by
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), among others. And, notably, the last prediction
suggests that transient shocks to MBS duration may account for some of the predictive power of
the tent-shaped combination of forward rates identi￿ed by Cochrane and Piassezi (2005).
2.3.5 The role of delta-hedging: ￿stock￿versus ￿￿ ow￿e⁄ects
One important simpli￿cation in the current model is that there is only one class of investors who
own MBS and price interest rate risk. In practice, there are two sets of intermediaries who own
MBS. One set of intermediaries ￿delta-hedge￿the embedded prepayment option and, thus, bear
a constant amount of interest rate risk over time. Other investors do not delta-hedge and, thus,
bear a time-varying amount of risk.8
Does it matter whether some MBS holders delta-hedge the prepayment option? In principle,
the answer is ￿no￿because the relevant hedging ￿ ows correspond one-for-one with changes in the
aggregate quantity of duration risk. To see this, consider a modi￿cation of the model feauturing
a set of banks who extend all mortgages to households. Assume banks do not bear interest
8Conversations with market participants suggest that the GSEs and commercial banks have historically been
the most prominent delta-hedgers of MBS.
11rate risk and instead delta-hedge their interest rate exposure. Speci￿cally, as the prepayment
option moves into-the-money, the banks buy noncallable bonds (e.g., Treasuries) to keep the total
duration of their assets ￿xed (and equal to that of their liabilities). Finally, assume that the
remaining supply of Treasuries is held by risk-averse bond arbitrageurs, and continue to assume
that households do not hedge their time-varying interest rate exposure.
Suppose there is a sudden drop in long rates that raises mortgage re￿nancing expectations.
From the perspective of banks, the existing mortgages now behave like short-term bonds. As a
result, banks will signi￿cantly reduce their delta hedges. That is, the banks will buy more long-
term Treasuries￿ ￿nanced by selling some short-term T-bills￿ in order to maintain their previous
asset duration. When borrowers actually re￿nance, banks will unwind these transactions. Thus,
banks have a temporarily elevated hedging demand for longer-term bonds. As a result, there is
a temporary reduction in the amount of interest rate risk that bond arbitrageurs must bear, so
the expected excess return on long-term bonds must fall in equilibrium.9
Clearly, the delta-hedging banks do not play an important role in this story. Hedging ￿ ows
in the model with banks correspond one-for-one to changes in the aggregate quantity of duration
risk born by investors in the model without banks. As a result, equilibrium bond prices in the
modi￿ed model will be the same as in the simpler model that omitted banks.10
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Measures of MBS duration and convexity
The aggregate duration of the MBS market is not a simple function of the current mortgage
rate. MBS duration also depends critically on the distribution of outstanding mortgage coupons
and, in this way, re￿ ects the past path of mortgage rates. Furthermore, there are times when
aggregate re￿nancing and thus MBS duration are more or less sensitive to changes in long yields.
Fortunately, the major brokerage ￿rms publish widely-followed estimates of the e⁄ective du-
ration of the US MBS market. Duration is the semi-elasticity of price with respect to yield￿ i.e.,
DUR = ￿P 0 (y)=P is the percentage change in price for a small change in yield￿ and is the
most widely used measure of interest rate risk. Bond convexity measures the curvature of the
price-yield relationship￿ i.e., CONV = (1=2)P 00 (y)=P. Thus, the percentage change in price
9Instead of dynamically delta-hedging the interest rate exposure of MBS, investors can also statically hedge
their exposures by purchasing interest rate options. Regardless of whether MBS investors pursue a dynamic or
a static hedging strategy, other investors must take the other side of these trades. Thus, in the aggregate, ￿xed
income investors must bear a time-varying amount of interest rate risk which impacts equilibrium term premia.
10There are reasons to think that extent of hedging may play a non-trivial role in practice. The MBS market
may not be perfectly integrated with the broader bond market, and the extent of hedging may re￿ ect the degree
of integration. Suppose there are two types of MBS investors: (i) delta-hedging intermediaries (e.g., the GSEs
and banks) who maintain a constant asset duration and (ii) ￿sleepers￿who inelastically buy a ￿xed quantity of
MBS irrespective of the duration risk they are taking (e.g., foreign o¢ cial holders). The duration that must be
absorbed by arbitrageurs is ￿tQMBS
t (y
(2)
t ). Thus, the fraction of MBS held by hedgers￿ an indicator of the degree
of market integration￿ will determine the extent to which shifts in MBS duration impact term premia.
12following a ￿y parallel shift in the yield curve is
%(￿P=P) ￿ ￿DUR ￿ ￿y + CONV ￿ (￿y)
2 . (10)
The duration of a negatively convex bond rises with yields. By contrast, the duration of a
positively convex bond falls with yields.
For callable bonds such as MBS, P (y) is calculated using a stochastic term structure model
and a prepayment model that forecasts MBS cash ￿ ows as a function of future rates. Using the
riskless yield curve and parameters governing interest rate volatility as inputs, one simulates a
large number of scenarios for the future path of rates. One computes the expected cash ￿ ows
in each scenario using the mortgage prepayment model and then discounts these expected cash
￿ ows using the implied zero-coupon curve in that scenario. The model-implied price is computed
by taking the probability-weighted average of the discounted cash ￿ ows in each scenario.11
In the baseline results, I use estimates of MBS duration from Barclays Capital which are
available from Datastream beginning in 1989. Aside from data availability, starting the analysis
in the late 1980s is sensible since the MBS market only rose to prominence in the mid-1980s.
The Barclays (formerly Lehman Brothers) Fixed Income Indices are the most widely followed
set of bond indices in the US. However, as shown in the Internet Appendix, I obtain nearly
identical results using the duration of Bank of America￿ s (formerly Merrill Lynch￿ s) US Mortgage
Master index, which is available starting in 1991. The correlation between Barclays￿and Bank
of America￿ s MBS duration measures is 0:79.
The Barclays US MBS index covers mortgage-backed pass-through securities guaranteed by
Ginnie Mae (GNMA), Fannie Mae (FNMA), and Freddie Mac (FHLMC), collectively known as
￿US Agency MBS.￿The index is comprised of pass-through securities backed by ￿conventional￿
￿xed-rate mortgages. The MBS index does not include non-Agency or private-label MBS (e.g.,
MBS backed by Jumbo, Alt-A, or subprime mortgages).12
I examine three related measures of duration:
￿ DURAGG
t is the e⁄ective duration of the Barclays Aggregate Index and measures the per-
centage change in the US bond market value following a parallel shift in the Treasury yield
curve. The Aggregate Index is a proxy for the broad US ￿xed income market and includes
Treasuries, Agency debentures, Agency MBS, investment grade corporates, and some ABS.
Many bond portfolios are benchmarked relative to the Aggregate Index.
￿ DURMBS
t is the e⁄ective duration of the Barclays MBS Index and measures the percentage
change in Agency MBS market value following a shift in the yield curve.
11To ensure the model-implied price equals the market price, analysts plug their discount function using an
option-adjusted-spread (OAS)￿ the constant spread one must add to the riskless curve in all scenarios so the
model-implied price equals the market price. E⁄ective duration and convexity are computed at the current OAS.
12Conventional mortgages satisfy several size, FICO, and loan-to-value requirements. For instance, mortgages
in GSE MBS are subject to the conforming loan size limit set by Congress, typically have FICO scores over 620,
and have a maximum LTV of 80%. The MBS Index is formed by grouping MBS pools into generic pools based
on agency, program (e.g., 30-year or 15-year), mortgage coupon, and origination year. A generic pool is included
in the Index if it has a contractual maturity greater than 1-year and more than $250 million outstanding.
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Scaling DURMBS
t this way captures the fact that shifts in MBS duration have had a grow-
ing impact on aggregate bond market duration due to the growth of the MBS market.
DUR_CNTRBMBS
t proxies for the transient component of aggregate bond market dura-
tion due to MBS and constitutes my preferred forecasting variable.
3.2 Understanding MBS duration
Before proceeding with the analysis, I explain several facts about MBS duration that play a key
role in the story. First, due to the embedded re￿nancing option, the average duration of MBS
is low. Second, MBS duration rises as interest rates rise. This ￿negative convexity￿property
underlies the positive-feedback dynamic emphasized in the paper. Third, shocks to the MBS
duration are transient, having a half-life of roughly 5:5 months. Finally, shifts in MBS duration
are large relative to investors￿risk-bearing capacity. In combination, the last two properties
mean that shocks to MBS duration generate signi￿cant, short-lived shifts in bond risk premium.
3.2.1 Average MBS duration is low
Panel A of Figure 1 plots my three duration measures over time. Table 1 presents summary
statistics for the main variables in the paper. My monthly sample runs from January 1989
to April 2011. DURMBS
t averages 3:35 years with a minimum of 0:58 years in May 2003 and
a maximum of 4:83 years in May 1994. That is, the typical price-yield sensitivity of MBS is
roughly equivalent to that of a 3:5 year, zero-coupon bond.
The low average duration of MBS re￿ ects two factors. First, the self-amortizing nature of
￿xed-rate mortgages lowers their duration relative to non-amortizing bonds. Second, and more
importantly, the prepayment option reduces the duration of MBS. A position in a callable bond
is equivalent to a position in a similar noncallable bond plus a short position in an interest
rate call option to repurchase the bond at par. Over the past 25 years the delta of the typical
prepayment option has been substantial. The option is typically struck slightly out-of-the-money
at origination, so the steady decline in rates since the mid-1980s means most prepayment options
have remained near the money.13
13The price of the callable bond is PC (y) = P (y) ￿ C (P (y)) where P (y) is the price of the underlying
143.2.2 Negative convexity of MBS
MBS are typically negatively convex: their duration rises as interest rates rise due to a decline
in expected prepayments. Empirically, a 100 bps increase in the 10-year Treasury yield has been
associated with a 1:37 year increase in DURMBS
t and a 0:34 increase in DURAGG
t since 1989.14
MBS convexity has played a larger role in US bond markets over time for two reasons. First,
the MBS market has grown signi￿cantly. The MBS index grew from 25% of the Aggregate index
in 1989 to 40% in 2008 but has fallen to 30% today due to the recent surge in Treasury borrowing.
Second, advances in information technology and heightened competition in mortgage banking
have reduced the costs of re￿nancing. As a result, re￿nancing now responds more aggressively to
changes in primary mortgage rates, so the MBS market has become more negatively convex. For
instance, prior to 2000, a 100 bps increase in the 10-year yield was associated with a 1:09 year
increase in the MBS duration. Since 2000, a 100 bps increase in the 10-year yield was associated
with a 1:57 year increase in the MBS duration.15
Another way to illustrate the negative convexity of the MBS market is to examine aggregate
re￿nancing behavior. MBS duration is low when expected future re￿nancing is high. And current
re￿nancing activity is a strong signal of re￿nancing over the near-term. Panel C of Figure
1 plots the Mortgage Bankers￿Association Re￿nancing Index, which re￿ ects the raw number
of mortgage applications classi￿ed as re￿nancings, versus a measure of ￿aggregate re￿nancing
incentives￿ . Speci￿cally, I show the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) ￿ltered version of the log-re￿nancing
index, essentially the percentage deviation of re￿nancings from an estimated trend. A borrower
has strong incentives to re￿nance when the primary rate is below her mortgage coupon, so
my measure of aggregate re￿nancing incentives is the di⁄erence between the average coupon of
MBS in the Barclays index and the 30-year primary mortgage rate from Freddie Mac￿ s survey,
ct ￿ yM;t. As shown in Panel C, there is a strong positive relationship between the two series.
The corresponding time-series regression has a R2 of 0:65 and suggests that a 100 bps increase
in re￿nancing incentives boosts aggregate re￿nancing by 85% relative to trend.
3.2.3 Shocks to MBS duration are transient
Shocks to the bond market duration are transient. Speci￿cally, the 1-month autocorrelation
of the duration of the Aggregate Index, DURAGG
t , is 0:88. The transient nature of aggregate
noncallable bond and C (P) is the price of the interest rate call. Since 0 < C0 (P) < 1, we have
Duration of callable
￿P0
C (y) =
Noncallable duration equivalents
(1 ￿ C0 (P (y))) ￿
Duration of noncallable
￿P0 (y) <
Duration of noncallable
￿P0 (y) ;
Convexity of callable
P00
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(1 ￿ C0 (P (y))) ￿
Convexity of noncallable
P00 (y) ￿
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(Duration of noncallable)
2
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2 :
Since P00 (y) > 0 and C00 (P) > 0, the sign of P00
C (y) is ambiguous. However, because callable bonds become more
negatively convex as rates decline, we have P00
C (y) < 0 unless the prepayment option is deeply out-of-the-money.
14Estimating ￿DURMBS
t = a + b ￿ ￿y
(10)
t + "t using monthly di⁄erences, I ￿nd b = 1:37 (R2 = 20:29).
15Beginning in 1997, Barclays￿estimates the e⁄ective negative convexity of the MBS index. If I estimate
￿DURMBS
t = a + b ￿ NCONV MBS
t ￿ ￿y
(10)
t + "t, I obtain a = 0:02 and b = 0:97 (R2 = 0:75) precisely as one
would expect. Furthermore, the estimated negative convexity has trended up over time.
15duration dynamics is driven by the MBS component of the index. Speci￿cally, the 1-month
autocorrelation of DURMBS
t is also 0:88, which implies that MBS duration shocks have a half-
life of 5:5 (=ln(0:5)=ln(0:88)) months. By contrast, the duration of the non-MBS portion of
the index is far more persistent with a 1-month autocorrelation of 0:96, implying a half-life for
non-MBS duration shocks of 17:5 months.
Why are shocks to MBS duration so transient? In the case of a downward shock to rates, the
explanation is fairly mechanical. A decline in rates raises expected prepayments, thus lowering
the amount of duration risk that holders of outstanding MBS face over the near term. As
homeowners respond to this interest rate shock, prepayments rise. When a borrower prepays,
she replaces a high coupon bond with a deep in-the-money prepayment option with a lower
coupon bond with a slightly out-of-the-money prepayment option. Borrowers e⁄ectively restrike
the interest rate call options embedded in their mortgages. The net e⁄ect of this re￿nancing
transaction raises the total quantity of duration that investors need to bear. However, because
prepayments are gradual, there are temporary declines in aggregate MBS duration, which then
predictably revert over time. By contrast, in the case of an upward shock to rates, we would not
expect such rapid mean reversion in MBS duration. This is because upward shocks to rates are
expected to slow re￿nancing activity, so there is no mechanical restriking e⁄ect.
3.2.4 Shifts in MBS duration are large relative to risk-bearing capacity
Due to the vast size of the MBS market, shifts in MBS duration have a large e⁄ect on the
aggregate amount of interest rate risk born by investors. And shifts in MBS duration drive
almost all high-frequency variation in aggregate bond market duration. This is shown in Panel B
of Figure 1 which uses equation (11) to decompose 12-month changes in aggregate bond market
duration into an MBS component and a non-MBS component. The MBS component accounts for
the vast bulk of the variation in aggregate duration. Indeed, the R2 from a regression of DURAGG
t
on DUR_CNTRBMBS
t is 0:61 in levels, 0:81 in 12-month changes, and 0:91 in 1-month changes.
To get a sense of the dollar magnitudes, investors convert aggregate duration statistics into
￿10-year US Treasury equivalents.￿If the market value of some asset class X is QX with e⁄ective
duration DX and the duration of a 10-year UST is DT10, then X represents QX ￿ (DX=DT10)
10-year US Treasury equivalents. Panel D of Figure 1 plots the detrended component of MBS
duration in 10-year Treasury equivalents (the trend is estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott
(1997) ￿lter). I convert historical dollars to 2012 dollars using the CPI. The ￿gure shows that the
resulting shifts in duration supply are massive. There are 26 sample months in which detrended
MBS 10-year equivalents exceed +$500 billion or ￿$500 billion.
These are arguably very large shifts in the quantity of duration risk relative to investors￿risk-
bearing capacity. We can compare the shifts in MBS duration with the Fed￿ s recent Quantitative
Easing (QE) operations. From 2008Q4 to 2010Q1 the Fed purchased $1;250 billion MBS with
an e⁄ective duration of roughly 3 years. Since the duration of the 10-year Treasury note was
roughly 8 years at this time, this amounted to a reduction of $469 billion ($469 = $1;250￿(3=8))
10-year equivalents of duration that needed to be held by investors (assuming no further change
16in interest rates). Thus, Panel D shows that numerous shifts in MBS duration since the late
1980s have been of a comparable scale to the Fed￿ s recent QE operations. Furthermore, these
shifts can occur quite rapidly￿ which is likely to be relevant if capital is slow-moving.
3.3 Forecasting excess bond returns
3.3.1 Basic forecasting results
I use data from G￿rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007) on the nominal Treasury yield curve as
updated regularly by the Federal Reserve Board. The log excess return on an n-year zero-coupon
bonds is de￿ned as rx
(n)
t+1 = n￿y
(n)
t ￿(n ￿ 1)￿y
(n￿1)
t+1 ￿y
(1)
t . Panel A of Table 1 provides summary
statistics on 12-month excess returns (rx
(n)
t+1) and yield spreads (y
(n)
t ￿y
(1)
t ) for n = 5;10, and 20.
I also summarize information on the instantaneous forward rates f
(m)
t for m = 1;2;3;4;5.
Table 2 uses the three bond duration measures to forecast excess returns on 10-year nominal
US Treasuries. Speci￿cally, Table 2 presents forecasting regressions of the form
rx
(10)
t+1 = a + b ￿ DURt + c
0xt + "
(10)
t+1: (12)
For the sake of comparability with the recent literature, the regressions are estimated with
monthly data, so each month I am forecasting excess returns over the following 12 months.
To deal with the overlapping nature of returns, t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987)
standard errors allowing for serial correlation at up to 18 lags. I estimate these regressions
with and without other forecasting variables identi￿ed in the literature on bond risk premia.
Speci￿cally, I control for the term spread following Campbell and Shiller (1991) and the ￿rst ￿ve
forward rates following Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005). I obtain similar results controlling for the
10-year forward rate spread following Fama and Bliss (1987) or if I control for longer-dated (e.g.,
7, 10, and 20-year) forwards as in Cieslak and Povala (2011).
Table 2 shows that Aggregate duration (DURAGG
t ), MBS duration (DURMBS
t ), and MBS du-
ration contribution (DUR_CNTRBMBS
t ) are each very strong predictors of bond excess returns.
MBS duration contribution is the strongest predictor, both in univariate speci￿cations as well as
in the multivariate regressions. Duration adds incremental forecasting power over and above (i)
the term spread, (ii) the forward rate spread, and (iii) arbitrary combinations of forward rates.
Speci￿cally, as shown in Table 2, duration signi￿cantly raises the R2 in these speci￿cations, and
the R2s are already quite high. For instance, column (2) shows that using the ￿rst ￿ve forward
rates as predictors delivers a forecasting R2 of 0:31. If we add MBS duration contribution to this
multivariate speci￿cation as in column (11), the forecasting R2 jumps to 0:46.
Comparing columns (2) and (11), we see that the inclusion of duration measures roughly
halves the absolute magnitude of the coe¢ cients on forward rates in the augmented Cochrane-
Piazzesi (2005) regression. I return to this observation below when I explain why MBS duration
may help to account for some of the forecasting power of Cochrane and Piazzesi￿ s tent factor.
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the basic forecasting result. Speci￿cally, Panel A shows a
scatter plot of 12-month future excess returns versus MBS duration contribution. These plots
17correspond to the multivariate estimates in column (10). Speci￿cally, I plot the component of
excess returns that is orthogonal to the term spread versus the component of duration that is
orthogonal to the term spread. The strong positive relationship is evident in Panel A. Panel B
plots 12-month future excess returns versus initial MBS duration contribution over time. The
￿gure shows that MBS duration adds signi￿cant forecasting power because duration extensions
in 1991, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2007, 2008, and 2011 were each followed by high bond excess returns.
Conversely, duration contractions in 1993, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2003, and 2009 were followed by
low excess returns. Thus, Figure 2 shows that the basic forecasting result is not driven by one
subsample or by a handful of outlying events. Indeed, in untabulated regressions, I obtain strong
results when I separately examine the 1989-1999 subsample or the 2000-2011 subsample.
What is the economic magnitude of the estimated e⁄ects? The coe¢ cient in column (10)
indicates that a 1 year increase in DUR_CNTRBMBS
t raises expected excess returns on 10-
year bonds by 14.629% over the following 12 months. A 1-standard deviation move in MBS
duration contribution is 0:29 years, so this implies that a 1-standard deviation increase in duration
raises expected excess returns by 4:20% = 14:629 ￿ 0:29. Assuming this shift has no e⁄ect on
expected returns beyond 12 months (analysis below suggests this is a reasonable assumption), this
corresponds to a rise in 10-year yields of 42 (= 420=10) bps today. Thus, the estimated e⁄ects are
highly economically signi￿cant. However, given the size and speed of the MBS duration shocks
relative to the scale of arbitrage capital, the e⁄ects do not seem implausibly large. I return to
this point below when I compare the implied price-impact from these regressions with estimates
from the literature evaluating the Federal Reserve￿ s Quantitative Easing policies.
These forecasting regressions suggest a simple market-timing strategy for diversi￿ed investors
(e.g., endowments and pensions) who allocate capital between the bond market and other ￿nan-
cial markets. Speci￿cally, diversi￿ed investors should overweight long-term bonds when MBS
duration is high and underweight long-term bonds when MBS duration is low. Unlike the spe-
cialist bond arbitrageurs emphasized in the model, the changes in the aggregate quantity of
interest rate risk perceived by these investors will be miniscule because bonds are only a small
portion of their overall ￿nancial portfolios. Thus, such diversi￿ed investors will perceive the re-
sulting time-variation in expected returns as time￿ varying ￿alpha￿as opposed to a time-varying
bond risk premium.
Naturally, the t-statistics from our forecasting regressions can be translated directly into a
statement about the Sharpe ratio of strategy that buys (sells) long-term bonds to the extent
that DUR_CNTRBMBS
t is above (below) its unconditional average.16 Estimating a univariate
regression with quarterly data yields a t-statistic of 2:91; implying a strategy Sharpe ratio of
0:303 = 2:91 ￿
p
92 per quarter. Assuming that strategy returns are iid, this implies an annual
Sharpe ratio of 0:606 =
p
4 ￿ 0:303. Of course, the fact that this timing strategy appears to be
so pro￿table suggests that diversi￿ed investors do not fully exploit it. This might be because
various frictions combine to limit the speed at which arbitrage capital ￿ ows across markets as
16Suppose rt+1 = ￿ + ￿ ￿ xt + "t+1 and consider returns on the strategy wt+1 = rt+1 (xt ￿ E [xt]). We have
SR[wt+1] = ￿￿2 [xt] ￿
p
￿2 ["t+1]￿2 [xt] = t[bOLS] ￿
p
T where t[bOLS] = ￿ ￿
q
T￿1￿2 ["t+1](￿2 [xt])
￿1 is the
population t-statistic for the OLS estimator of ￿.
18in Du¢ e (2010). Or this might simply be because many diversi￿ed investors are unaware of the
high Sharpe ratio o⁄ered by the strategy.
3.3.2 MBS duration accounts for all the forecasting power of aggregate duration
Table 3 shows that all of the forecasting power of DURAGG derives from the MBS component.
Speci￿cally, I decompose DURAGG into the sum of DUR_CNTRBMBS
t and DUR_CNTRBOTH
t
as in equation (11). As discussed above, the transient MBS component accounts for the vast ma-
jority of all high-frequency variation in aggregate bond market duration. Indeed, the 12-month
autocorrelations of DURAGG, DUR_CNTRBMBS
t , and DUR_CNTRBOTH
t are 0:16, 0:04, and
0:64. Thus, perhaps not surprisingly, the horseraces in columns (4), (8), and (12) of Table 3 show
that all of the near-term forecasting power in aggregate bond market duration is attributable
to MBS duration. A similar conclusion holds if, instead of DUR_CNTRBOTH
t , I focus more
narrowly on the duration of the Barclays Treasury Index.
In summary, both the duration of the Aggregate Index and the MBS Index positively forecasts
excess bond returns over the following 12 months. And the duration contribution of MBS￿ which
scales MBS duration relative to the broader market￿ is the strongest forecaster. However, the
measured duration of the Treasury and other non-MBS ￿xed income markets do not reliably
forecast bond returns at the quarterly or annual frequencies considered here, at least not in my
1989-present sample. This is perhaps not surprising if one considers a preferred-habit model with
slow-moving capital. In such a model, capital ￿ ows in response to persistent changes in bond
risk premia which neutralizes some, but not all, of the e⁄ects of persistent shocks to duration
supply on expected returns. Thus, from a medium-frequency return forecasting perspective, it
may be particularly useful to isolate the transient component of shocks to bond duration supply.
And the preceding analysis suggests that MBS duration is an excellent proxy for this transient
component of duration supply.17
3.3.3 Time signature of MBS duration e⁄ects
There are several reasons to expect variation in MBS duration to be associated with relatively
high frequency variation in expected returns. First, if current MBS duration positively predicts
bond excess returns over the following instant, we would not expect the current duration to
reliably predict returns on 12-month forward basis since MBS duration is not itself very persistent.
Second, there may be slow-moving capital e⁄ects as in Du¢ e (2010) which implies that the short-
run demand curve for duration risk is more inelastic than the long-run demand curve. Speci￿cally,
suppose that, in the short-run, interest rate risk is priced by specialized bond market investors
with a ￿xed risk tolerance. However, over longer horizons, diversi￿ed investors may allocate
￿nancial capital between the bond market and other ￿nancial markets as in Du¢ e and Strulovici
(2012). Thus, following a positive shock to duration supply, we might expect bond risk premia to
17Admittedly, since my measures of MBS duration re￿ ect forward-looking expectations of future MBS duration
but my measures of Treasury duration are not forward-looking, this horserace between MBS and non-MBS
duration is not a completely fair ￿ght.
19jump. The anticipation of large future bond returns would draw in capital from other markets,
raising the risk tolerance of bond investors and, thus, reducing the impact of supply on bond
risk premia over time in the case of a permanent supply shock.
To formally explore the time signature of my main forecasting result, I use MBS duration
to forecast quarterly returns from one to eight quarters ahead. Figure 3 presents quarterly
forecasting regressions of the form
rx
(10)
t+(j￿1)=4!t+j=4 = a(j) + b(j) ￿ DUR_CNTRB
MBS
t + c
0
(j)xt + "
(10)
t+(j￿1)=4!t++j=4 (13)
for j = 1;:::;8. Figure 3 then plots the coe¢ cients b(j) versus the horizon j. This series of
regressions provides a simple non-parametric way to trace out the ￿impulse response￿of quarterly
excess bond returns following a movement in MBS duration. Speci￿cally, Panel A of Figure 3
plots the coe¢ cients b(j) from univariate regressions and Panel B plots the coe¢ cients from
multivariate speci￿cations that control for the term spread. Figure 3 shows that the forecasting
power of bond duration is largely located in the following two quarters. The e⁄ect decays
meaningfully from three to four quarters out, and there is generally little predictive power beyond
￿ve quarters.
To investigate the timing of these e⁄ects more parametrically, I estimate ￿rst order Vector
Autoregression (VAR) of including excess returns, MBS duration, and the term spread using
quarterly data
rx
(10)
t+1=4 = a1 + b1 ￿ rxt + c1 ￿ DURt + d1 ￿ (y
(10)
t ￿ y
(1)
t ) + "1;t+1=4 (14)
DURt+1=4 = a2 + b2 ￿ rxt + c2 ￿ DURt + d2 ￿ (y
(10)
t ￿ y
(1)
t ) + "2;t+1=4
y
(10)
t+1=3 ￿ y
(1)
t+1=4 = a3 + b3 ￿ rxt + c3 ￿ DURt + d3 ￿ (y
(10)
t ￿ y
(1)
t ) + "3;t+1=4.
Using DUR_CNTRBMBS
t =
￿
MV MBS
t =MV AGG
t
￿
￿ DURMBS
t as our measure of MBS duration,
Figure 4 shows the resulting simple impulse response of quarterly excess bond returns to a shock
to MBS duration. As expected, the e⁄ect on excess bond returns from a shock to MBS duration
is concentrated in the next 4 quarters. Furthermore, using a parametric VAR, paints a very
similar picture of the timing of the e⁄ects to the non-parametric approach show in Figure 3.
3.3.4 Results for multiple maturities
If changes in DURt shift the duration risk premium in US bond markets, we would expect this
to have a larger e⁄ect on the expected returns of long-term bonds than on intermediate bonds.
For instance, the coe¢ cient on DURt when forecasting 20-year excess bond returns should be
larger than when forecasting 10-year excess bond returns. This is illustrated in the left-most
plots in Figure 4 where I estimate
rx
(n)
t+1 = a(n) + b(n) ￿ DURt + "
(n)
t+1 (15)
20for n = 2;::::20. I then plot the coe¢ cients, b(n), versus maturity n. I show results for DURMBS
t
in Panel A and DUR_CNTRBMBS
t in Panel B. As shown in Figure 4, the coe¢ cients b(n)
are increasing in maturity n, consistent with the idea that shifts in MBS duration impact the
duration risk premia in bond markets.
How do shifts in MBS duration impact bond yields and the current shape of the yield curve?
As explained above, due to their transitory nature, we would expect MBS duration supply shocks
to have a hump-shaped e⁄ect on the yield curve and forward rate curve. Although a transitory
rise in the duration risk premium has the largest impact on the price and current expected excess
returns of long-term bonds, it has the largest impact on the yield of intermediate term bonds.
As in Greenwood and Vayanos (2013), the intuition is that the impact bond yields equals the
e⁄ect on a bond￿ s average returns over its lifetime. As a result, a temporary rise in duration
risk premium has a greater impact intermediate-term yields than on long-term yields when the
supply shock is expected to be short-lived.
These results are shown in the middle and right-most plots in Figure 4. Speci￿cally, I plot
the slope coe¢ cients versus maturity from estimating
y
(n)
t ￿ y
(n)
t+1 = a(n) + b(n) ￿ DURt + "
(n)
t+1
and
f
(n)
t ￿ f
(n)
t+1 = a(n) + b(n) ￿ DURt + "
(n)
t+1
for n = 0;1;2;:::;20. In other words, I use DURt to forecast the decline in yields and forwards
over the following 12-months for each maturity. Figure 4 shows that high level of current MBS
duration has a humped shaped e⁄ect on the yield and forward rate curves. Speci￿cally, the
expected decline in rates over the following 12-months is largest for intermediate yields and
forwards, having its maximal e⁄ect on 2 year yields.
This suggests that transient shocks to MBS duration may account for some of the predictive
power of the tent-shaped combination of forward rates identi￿ed by Cochrane and Piassezi (2005).
The Cochrane-Piazzesi (2005) factor picks up time-variation in the curvature of the yield curve
and is useful for forecasting transitory variation in bond returns￿ i.e., variation at frequencies
higher than a standard business cycle frequency. Thus, the variation in MBS duration may help
explain why a tent-shaped combination of forwards can explain transitory variation in bond risk
premia. Of course, any fast-moving state variable that a⁄ects bond risk-premia should have a
hump-shaped e⁄ect on yields and forwards as basic matter of no-arbitrage bond pricing logic.
However, the literature has generally struggled to produce economically plausible state variables
that might induce high-frequency variation in bond risk-premium. I argue that MBS duration is
one such variable, and, thus the fact that it ￿ghts with the Cochrane-Piazzesi (2005) factor as
noted above is quite natural.
In summary, the ￿ndings for multiple maturities are highly consistent with the model I
develop in the Internet Appendix and prior work by Vayanos and Vila (2009) and Greenwood
and Vayanos (2013), who argue that shifts in the maturity structure of borrowing￿ holding
21constant total dollar borrowing￿ can signi￿cantly impact term premia. And this indicates that
the Fed￿ s Quantitative Easing policies can potentially impact the duration risk premium through
a broad ￿portfolio balance channel,￿consistent with the ￿ndings of Gagnon et. al. (2011) and
Greenwood and Vayanos (2013).
3.3.5 Robustness checks
Running a regression of returns on quantities does not, in general, allow one to cleanly identify
a demand curve. Instead, to nail down the MBS duration supply channel, I would like to
show that some component of MBS duration that is exogenous with respect to interest rates
positively forecasts excess bond returns. Otherwise, one might worry that MBS duration is
simply correlated with some omitted variable which is driving demand for bonds. Unfortunately,
it is di¢ cult to construct a valid and powerful instrument for MBS duration. However, since
the issues addressed here are of ￿rst order importance for our understanding of bond market
dynamics and the determination of risk premia more generally, we should be willing to live with
evidence that is admittedly somewhat indirect. Speci￿cally, I am forced to rely on predictive
regressions that provide indirect evidence consistent with the MBS hedging story.
In the Internet Appendix, I address several concerns raised by this indirect approach. First,
one might be concerned that variation in DURt does itself not drive the term premium but is
simply correlated with an omitted variable that does. The Internet Appendix shows that the
coe¢ cient on DURt is highly robust to the inclusion of additional controls that are thought to be
associated with term premia. This should help to alleviate most natural concerns about omitted
variable bias. Second, I address the standard econometric concerns that arise when estimating
time-series forecasting regressions. These econometric issues are not a signi￿cant concern in this
context. Finally, one might worry that the results are somehow speci￿c to the Barclays￿indices I
use throughout. The Internet Appendix shows that similar forecasting results obtain when using
the Bank of America MBS indices instead of the Barclays￿indices.
3.3.6 Comparison to prior estimates of the price impact of duration supply shocks
I now compare the price-impact e⁄ects implied by my regressions with estimates from the recent
literature evaluating the Federal Reserve￿ s Large Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) programs. To
draw this comparison, I assume that LSAP￿ s primarily work by impacting term premia following
Gagnon et al (2012) among others. To be clear, I am not arguing that mortgage re￿nancing
explains why LSAP policies do or do not work. However, both mortgage re￿nancing waves and
LSAPs are sources of duration supply shocks that have the potential to impact term premia.
Thus, it is interesting to compare the price impact of supply shocks from LSAPs and mortgage
re￿nancing waves.
Before proceeding, there are several reasons to expect di⁄erent price-impact magnitudes for
LSAP- and mortgage-re￿nancing-induced duration shocks. First, it is likely that investor risk-
bearing capacity varies over time, so we should expect to ￿nd larger e⁄ects for LSAPs to the
extent they occurred when risk-bearing capacity was low. Further, the LSAP-induced shocks
22would have been expected to last longer than mortgage duration shocks, suggesting that LSAPs
should have a larger impact on yields due to their more persistent e⁄ect on term premia. However,
LSAPs were arguably far more ￿advertised￿ than mortgage duration shocks, suggesting that
mortgage shocks might have a larger impact than LSAPs if, as in Du¢ e (2010), investors were
more inattentive in the former case. Thus, it is not obvious whether we should expect to ￿nd
larger e⁄ects for MBS duration shocks or for LSAPs.
Table 4 compares the estimated e⁄ect of supply shocks measured in 10-year Treasury duration
equivalents. Table 4 provides more detail on the LSAPs, the prior literature estimating their
impact on 10-year yields, and the estimated e⁄ects implied by the MBS duration e⁄ect. I use my
estimates to predict the e⁄ect of LSAP announcements on 10-year Treasury yields. Speci￿cally,
using speci￿cations of the form y
(10)
t ￿ y
(10)
t+1 = a + b ￿ DURt + "
(10)
t+1 as in Figure 4, I estimate
that a one standard deviation decline in DURMBS
t has lowered 10-year Treasury yields by 36 bps
over my 1989-present sample. Based on the relationship between DURMBS
t and MBS 10-year
equivalents in Figure 1, I estimate that a one standard deviation decline in DURMBS
t corresponds
to a $503 billion reduction in 10-year equivalents in recent years.18
The ￿rst LSAP was announced in late 2008 and early 2009 amidst unusually strained market
conditions (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2013)). Since LSAP1 represented a cumu-
lative reduction in $750 billion 10-year equivalents, my estimates imply a 54 bps = 36 bps
￿ (750/503) decline in 10-year Treasury yields. This implied e⁄ect is smaller than event-study-
based estimates of the impact of LSAP1 on 10-year yields which average nearly 100 bps. However,
this di⁄erence makes sense since intermediary risk-bearing capacity was quite limited at the time
of LSAP1. Table 4 shows that the implied e⁄ect is slightly larger for univariate regressions using
DUR_CNTRBMBS
t or for multivariate regressions that control for the term spread. For LSAP2
and LSAP3, which were announced in late 2010 and late 2011 respectively, the e⁄ects implied by
my estimates are in line with the estimated LSAP announcement e⁄ects in the prior literature.
In summary, the price-impact of supply implied by my regressions is broadly in line with
those documented in the recent event-study literature on LSAPs. To be clear, my results do not
show that LSAPs have lowered the duration risk premium in bond markets or that they work at
all.19 However, my evidence does provide an out-of-sample ￿proof of concept￿for LSAP policies
that seek to impact market-wide term premia.
3.3.7 A decomposition of aggregate MBS duration
I now decompose aggregate MBS duration. The decomposition shows that DURMBS
t re￿ ects
both aggregate re￿nancing incentives, prepayment burnout, and several other factors. I then
18I obtain this estimate by regressing the deviation of Q
MBS
t (DUR
MBS
t =DUR
T10
t ) from trend (in constant 2012
dollar) on DURMBS
t from 2008 to present.
19Besides moving the duration risk premium, LSAP policies may impact yields throughout the bond market
through a variety of distinct channels. This is a lively area of scholarly debate. See Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011 and 2013). Furthermore, LSAPs may also have local e⁄ects: comparing securities with similar
durations, D￿ Amico et al (2012) and Cahill et al (2013), ￿nd larger intra-day declines in yields on those securities
that the Federal Reserve is actually purchasing.
23show that both aggregate re￿nancing incentives and these other terms appear to contribute to
the forecasting power of DURMBS
t .
Let yM;t denote the primary mortgage rate, and take ￿rst-order expansion of the duration of
mortgage class i (e.g., 6% FNMA 30-years originated 3 years ago) about its coupon cit:
DURit = Dit ￿ CONVit ￿ (yM;t ￿ cit) + ￿it,
where ￿it is the approximation error. Letting Xt =
P
i witXit and ￿t [Xit;Yit] =
P
i wit (Xit ￿ Xt)(Yit ￿ Yt)
denote the market-weighted average and covariance, aggregate MBS duration is given by:
DURt = Dt + CONVt ￿ (ct ￿ yM;t) + ￿t [CONVit;cit] + ￿t.
There are two main terms20:
￿ Aggregate re￿nancing incentives. The ￿rst term depends on the aggregate re￿nancing
incentive, (ct￿yM;t). We can further decompose this term using deviations from time-series
average of Dt and CONVt
Dt + CONVt ￿ (ct ￿ yM;t) = [D + CONV ￿ (ct ￿ yM;t)]
+[(Dt ￿ D) + (CONVt ￿ CONV ) ￿ (ct ￿ yM;t)]:
Since it is likely that Dt and CONVt only vary slowly over time, this suggests that (ct￿yM;t)
should be a strong linear predictor of excess returns.
￿ Aggregate prepayment ￿burnout￿ . ￿t [CONVit;cit] measures the extent to which low
callability is concentrated in high coupon MBS. Aggregate MBS duration is high when
aggregate burnout is high. For instance, some analysts have argued that burnout has been
elevated in recent years because borrowers who are still in higher coupon mortgages cannot
re￿nance due to negative home equity or tighter mortgage underwriting standards.
This works largely as one might expect in the data. Speci￿cally, there is a strong negative
relationship between DURMBS
t and (ct ￿ yM;t):
DUR
MBS
t = 3:095
[18:22]
￿ 0:952
[￿5:56]
￿ (ct ￿ yM;t), R
2 = 0:48.
Adding a time trend (t) and interactions terms, I obtain
DUR
MBS
t = 3:610
[16:76]
￿ 0:835
[￿5:18]
￿ (ct ￿ yM;t) ￿ 0:276
[￿0:58]
￿ (ct ￿ yM;t) ￿ t ￿ 1:041
[￿2:01]
￿ t, R
2 = 0:58.
Thus, MBS duration has trended down by a little more than 1 year since 1989, and there is weak
evidence that CONVt has become slightly more negative over time.
20We can gain further insight into the residual ￿t using a second-order Taylor expansion of DURit. This suggests
that aggregate MBS duration is decreasing in the cross-sectional variation in mortgage outstanding coupons.
24Consistent with the previous decomposition, columns 1-3 of Table 5 show that the aggregate
re￿nancing incentive, ct ￿ yM;t, is a strong negative predictor of excess bond returns. As above,
my measure of aggregate re￿nancing incentives is the weighted-average coupon on MBS in the
Barclays Index minus the current 30-year primary mortgage rate from Freddie Mac. The fore-
casting power of this variable derives from comparing the primary mortgage rate (a variable that
is almost a perfect linear combination of forwards) with the average coupon on outstanding MBS
(a variable not spanned by forwards). Naturally, ct is itself a very slow-moving variable that re-
￿ ects historical path dependencies. Columns 7-9 of Table 4 show that I also obtain similar results
if I forecast returns using a normalized version of the Mortgage Banking Association￿ s re￿nancing
index, REFIt. Speci￿cally, the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) ￿ltered version of the log-re￿nancing
index is a strong negative predictor of returns. Thus, Table 5 shows that my main ￿ndings
are not an artifact of using MBS duration￿ an admittedly complex model-based construct￿ and
supports the broader hypothesis that aggregate mortgage re￿nancing activity plays a key role in
driving bond risk premia.
Finally, columns 4-6 and 10-12 of Table 5 show forecasting horseraces between my preferred
measure of MBS duration (DUR_CNTRBMBS
t ) and re￿nancing incentives (ct ￿ yM;t) and re-
￿nancing activity (REFIt), respectively. Consistent with the previous decomposition, these
horseraces suggest that much of the information that DUR_CNTRBMBS
t contains about future
excess returns is also contained in ct ￿ yM;t (and REFIt). However, the horseraces suggest that
model-based MBS duration estimates do contain additional information above and beyond these
simpler measures. This is not surprising since MBS duration re￿ ects the forward-looking sup-
ply expectations of market participants. Furthermore, DUR_CNTRBMBS
t also captures e⁄ects
such as aggregate prepayment burnout, which are not re￿ ected in the simpler measures.
3.3.8 The growing impact of MBS duration on term premia
Have shifts in MBS duration become a more or less important driver of term premia over time?
My story suggests that these e⁄ects should have grown more far important over time: the rapid
growth of the MBS market means that these duration shocks have become far more signi￿cant
relative to the risk tolerance of bond investors. The signi￿cant growth of the MBS market relative
to the rest of the bond market is illustrated in Panel A of Figure 6.
Fortunately, I can investigate the evolution of these e⁄ects by examining data prior to 1989.
Although I only have data on the model-based e⁄ective duration of MBS beginning in 1989,
Barclay￿ s publishes a cruder duration measure called Macaulay duration-to-worst dating back to
1976.21 I use dur to denote the Macaulay analogs of the more commonly used modi￿ed duration
measures (DUR).Thus, going back to 1976, I can ask whether durMBS
t and dur_cntrbMBS
t = ￿
MV MBS
t =MV AGG
t
￿
durMBS
t have predictive power for excess bond returns. While the model-
based e⁄ective duration measures provide a more accurate measure of the sensitivity of MBS
21Macaulay duration-to-worst is the Macaulay duration corresponding to the yield-to-worst. Speci￿cally, one
assumes a deterministic set of future MBS cash￿ ows based on an assumed prepayment pro￿le (typically the
expected prepayment pro￿le, which depends on current interest rates). The yield-to-worst and Macaulay duration-
to-worst are then simply the yield and Macauley duration assuming this set of future bond cash ￿ ows.
25prices to changes in yields, Macaulay duration-to-worst contains similar information in the time-
series. These two measures are shown in Panel B of Figure 6. For instance, from 1989-present
when both measures are available, the correlation between e⁄ective duration and Macaulay
duration-to-worst of MBS is 0:91 in levels and 0:91 in 12-month changes. I can also construct
my measure of aggregate re￿nancing incentives￿ i.e., the di⁄erence between the average MBS
coupon and current primary mortgage rates (ct ￿ yM;t) going back to 1976.
Since Panel A of Figure 6 shows that the MBS market grew signi￿cantly relative to the rest of
the bond market from 1976 to the early 1990s, examining the forecasting power of MBS duration
over this early period is useful. Table 6 shows subsample forecasting results. I ￿nd that the three
measures of MBS duration have no predictive power for excess bond returns over the 1976-1988
subsample, but have signi￿cant predictive power from 1989-present (including both the 1989-1999
and 2000+ sub-samples). Figure 7 makes a similar point and shows the results from 60-month
(20-quarter) rolling regressions of 3-month excess returns on MBS duration measures, controlling
for the term spread. The results show an unmistakable upward trend in the predictive power of
MBS duration. Over time, the coe¢ cients have grown and are being estimated more precisely, so
the t-statistics have grown. The fact that these e⁄ects have grown so much stronger over time,
precisely as I would predict, provides further indirect evidence for my MBS hedging story.
3.3.9 Predicting foreign bond returns
Do shifts in the duration of US mortgage backed securities impact term premia in foreign bond
markets? This question is addressed in Table 7, which investigates whether the duration of US
MBS forecasts the excess returns on long-term foreign bonds. What one should expect to ￿nd
here depends on the degree of integration between the bond markets in di⁄erent countries. At
one extreme, if foreign bond markets were completely segmented from the US bond market, we
would expect US MBS duration to have no forecasting power for foreign excess bond returns. At
the other extreme, if there were a single integrated global bond market, we would expect term
premia to move in lock-step across national bond markets. In between these two extremes, one
would expect US MBS duration to have some predictive power for excess foreign bond returns,
albeit less than for US excess bond returns.
Following Campbell (1999, 2003), I work with IFS data and compute excess returns on
coupon-bearing long-term foreign government bonds over short-term foreign bond using the
Campbell, Shiller, and Schoenholtz (1983) approximation.22 I compute foreign government bond
returns for ten developed countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. I then estimate univariate forecasting regressions of the form
rx
FOR(n)
c;t+1 = a + b ￿ DURt + "
FOR(n)
c;t+1 , (16)
22This approximation says that log excess return on a n-year coupon bond over the short rate (y
(1)
t ) is rx
(n)
c;t+1 ￿
D
(n)
t y
(n)
c;t ￿ (D
(n)
t ￿ 1)y
(n￿1)
c;t+1 ￿ y
(1)
t where Y
(n)
c;t is the yield on a n-year coupon bond, y
(n)
c;t = ln(1 + Y
(n)
c;t ), and
D
(n)
t = [1 ￿ (1 + Y
(n)
c;t )￿n]=[1 ￿ (1 + Y
(n)
c;t )￿1] is the approximate duration on an n-year coupon bond.
26and multivariate regressions controlling for the US term spread and foreign country term spread
rx
FOR(n)
c;t+1 = a + b ￿ DURt + c ￿ (y
US(n)
c;t ￿ y
US(1)
t ) + d ￿ (y
FOR(n)
c;t ￿ y
FOR(1)
t ) + "
FOR(n)
c;t+1 : (17)
To assess the di⁄erential forecasting power for foreign bond excess returns as compared to US
domestic bond returns, for each country I rerun the regressions with rx
FOR(n)
c;t+1 ￿rx
US(n)
c;t+1 on the left-
hand-side. I then report the coe¢ cient on DURt from this speci￿cation as well as the associated
t-statistic, labeled as ￿Di⁄ from USA￿in the table. Panel A shows results for DURMBS
t and
Panel B shows results for DUR_CNTRBMBS
t .
Table 7 shows that there is evidence of moderate cross-country spillovers. US MBS du-
ration has some limited ability to forecast excess returns on long-term government bonds in
Canada, Denmark, Japan, and the UK. However, in each case, the magnitude of the forecasting
relationships for foreign bonds is much weaker, both economically and statistically, than the
corresponding magnitude for US bonds. In short, the evidence is consistent with the view that
the bond markets of, say, the US and the UK are partially integrated, so a duration supply shock
in the US has some impact on bond risk premia in the UK. At the same time, the fact that the
US return forecasting results are so much stronger than the foreign return forecasting results
provides additional comfort that the results do not re￿ ect an omitted global risk factor.
3.4 Excess sensitivity of long-term yields and forwards to short rates
The model suggests that distant forward rates should be excessively sensitive to movements
in short-term interest rates (see Proposition 2 above). As shown in Hanson and Stein (2012),
this general excess sensitivity result emerges very strongly in the data. This is consistent with
Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) who ￿nd that distant forwards are excessively sensitive to
macroeconomic announcements. And, as emphasized by Hanson and Stein (2012), one observes
signi￿cant excess sensitivity for distant real forward rates￿ i.e., forwards extracted from the
TIPs yield curve. While this is puzzling from the standpoint of textbook macro-￿nance theories,
excess sensitivity follows naturally from models that emphasize supply and demand e⁄ects in
bonds markets. For instance, an extension in MBS duration increases the exposure of investors
to movements in short-term real rates, necessitating a rise in the real term premium.
Going further, the model predicts that distant forwards should be particularly sensitive to
short rates when the MBS market is more negatively convex (see Proposition 3 above). When
the market is more negatively convex, a given change in short rates has a larger e⁄ect on the total
quantity of interest rate risk and, hence, a larger impact on distant forward term premia. To
test this prediction, I examine whether the high-frequency sensitivity of distant forwards varies
with MBS convexity. In Table 8, I estimate daily regressions of the form
￿f
X(10)
t = a + b ￿ ￿y
$(2)
t + c ￿ NCONV
MBS
t + d ￿ (￿y
$(2)
t ￿ NCONV
MBS
t ) + ￿"
X(10)
t , (18)
where NCONV MBS
t = ￿CONV MBS
t (i.e., negative one times the convexity of the MBS index)
for X = $ and TIPS￿ i.e., I examine changes in both 10-year nominal and 10-year real forwards.
27I estimate these regressions from 1999-present to include data on real forwards from G￿rkaynak,
Sack, and Wright (2010).23 The theory predicts that d > 0: excess sensitivity should be more
pronounced when the MBS market is more negatively convex.
Consistent with this prediction, Table 8 shows that both distant nominal and real forwards
are more sensitive to movements in short-term nominal rates when the MBS market is more
negatively convex. Since NCONV MBS
t is quite persistent at daily frequencies, t-statistics are
based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors allowing for serial correlation up to 20 business
days. From 1999-present, NCONV MBS
t has averaged 1:528 with a standard deviation of 0:531.
Thus, on average, a 100 bps increase in the 2-year nominal yield has been associated with a 54
bps (=0:322 + 0:140 ￿ 1:528) increase in 10-year nominal forwards and a 30 bps increase in 10-
year real forwards. However, when NCONV MBS
t is two standard deviations above average, the
same 100 bps increase in the nominal short rates has been associated with a 68 bps increase in
10-year nominal forwards and a 42 bps increase in 10-year real forwards. Thus, variation in MBS
convexity has been associated with meaningful variation in the sensitivity of distant forwards to
movements in short rates. Furthermore, this is true whether (i) I look at NCONV MBS
t or the
scaled version of this variable, NCONV MBS
t ￿
￿
MV MBS
t =MV AGG
t
￿
or (ii) I examine sensitivity
to movements in short-term nominal yields or short-term forwards (i.e., if I replace ￿y
$(2)
t with
￿f
$(2)
t in equation (18)).
3.5 Excess volatility of long-term interest rates
The model suggests that, all else being equal, long-term interest rate volatility will be elevated
when the MBS market is more negatively convex. Intuitively, the positive-feedback dynamic
underlying MBS duration spirals is stronger when the mortgage market is on a re￿nancing cli⁄￿
i.e., when a small movement in rates will signi￿cantly impact aggregate re￿nancing behavior.
To test this prediction, I follow the approach of Perli and Sack (2003), who relate weekly
observations of option-implied interest rate variance to measures of MBS convexity. Speci￿cally,
Perli and Sack (2003) assume that ￿yt =
p
1 + ￿xt ￿ "t where ￿2
";t follows an AR(1) process
￿2
";t = ￿0 + ￿1￿2
";t￿1 + ut, so that
￿
2
￿y;t = (1 + ￿xt)￿
2
";t = ￿0 (1 + ￿xt) + ￿1
1 + ￿xt
1 + ￿xt￿1
￿
2
￿y;t￿1 + (1 + ￿xt)ut.
There are three e⁄ects: a level e⁄ect ￿0 (1 + ￿xt), a persistence e⁄ect (the second term), and
a volatility of volatility e⁄ect (the third term). However, if xt is fairly persistent we will have
(1 + ￿xt)=(1 + ￿xt￿1) ￿ 1. Furthermore, Perli and Sack (2003) ￿nd that the volatility of volatil-
ity e⁄ect is ignorable in practice. Thus, using xt = NCONVt, I focus solely on the level e⁄ect
￿
2
￿y;t = ￿0 (1 + ￿ ￿ NCONVt) + ￿1￿
2
￿y;t￿1 + ut:
23The convexity of Barclays MBS index is available for 1997-present. I obtain similar results for nominal
forwards for this period.
28Of course, there is a simultaneity problem here since NCONVt is a function of ￿2
￿y;t. To deal
with this, I substitute NCONVt￿1 for NCONVt in the above.
Following Perli and Sack (2003), I measure ￿2
￿y;t using the implied yield variance (the square
of implied volatility) from 3-month by 10-year swaptions￿ i.e., the option to enter into a 10-
year swap at pre-speci￿ed rate in 3 months. I ￿rst regress the implied variance from 3-month
by 10-year swaptions on the implied variance from 2-year by 10-year swaptions and examine
the residuals from this regression. As Perli and Sack (2003) argue, it is desirable to strip out
structural/cyclical ￿ uctuations in interest rate volatility in this way because MBS convexity is
expected to have fairly transient e⁄ects on implied volatility. Using the resulting residualized
measure, e ￿
2
￿y;t, I then estimate
e ￿
2
￿y;t￿1 = ￿0 (1 + ￿ ￿ NCONVt￿1) + ￿1e ￿
2
￿y;t￿1 + ut. (19)
Data on MBS convexity is available beginning in 1997, so I estimate speci￿cation (19) using
weekly data from 1997-present. t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors
allowing for serial correlation at a lag of up to 12 weeks.
The results are shown in Table 9 and indicate that option-implied yield variance is higher
when the MBS market is more negatively convex. This conclusion holds whether I look at
NCONV MBS
t or the scaled version of this variable, NCONV MBS
t ￿
￿
MV MBS
t =MV AGG
t
￿
, and
when I control for lagged swap yields in equation (19). The estimates in column (2) imply
that a one standard deviation increase in NCONV raises implied yield volatility by 0:10%
(=
p
0:020 ￿ 0:519). The standard deviation of e ￿￿y;t￿1 is 0:48%, suggesting that movements in
MBS convexity are associated with economically signi￿cant shifts in interest rate volatility.
3.6 Impact of MBS duration on corporate and swap spreads
In practice, MBS investors hedge the interest rate exposure of MBS using either Treasuries or
interest rate swaps. Regardless of the speci￿c hedging instrument, other investors must take
the other side of these trades. Thus, in the aggregate, ￿xed income investors must bear a time-
varying amount of interest rate risk, which impacts equilibrium term premia. In a simple model
in which Treasuries and swaps are perfect substitutes, one would not expect these hedging ￿ ows
to impact spreads between swaps and Treasuries. But di⁄erent long-term ￿xed income assets
with the same duration are not perfect substitutes. Once we relax the assumption of perfect
substitutability, hedging ￿ ows triggered by shifts in MBS duration may impact yield spreads
between duration-matched ￿xed income assets and give rise to predictable variation in the excess
returns on various ￿xed income assets over duration-matched government bonds.
In the Internet Appendix, I consider an stylized model with three long-term ￿xed income
assets: government bonds, interest rate swaps, and high grade corporate bonds. I suppose that
some fraction of MBS duration is hedged using interest rate swaps and the remainder is hedged
using government bonds. While all long-term ￿xed income assets are exposed to interest rate
risk, there are components of returns that are speci￿c to government bonds, swaps, and corporate
29bonds. For corporate bonds, this might re￿ ect changes in credit risk. And, for all three assets, we
can think of these components as re￿ ecting shifts in supply and demand for speci￿c assets. For
instance, in the case of government bonds, this might re￿ ect idiosyncratic shifts in the demand
as in a ￿￿ ight to quality￿episode (e.g., Du⁄ee (1996), Longsta⁄ (2004), etc.) or idiosyncratic
shifts in supply (e.g., Greenwood and Vayanos (2010) and Lou, Yan, and Zhang (2013)).
In my stylized model, the expected excess returns on any long-term ￿xed income asset over
short-term bonds is equal to a term premium earned by all long-term ￿xed income assets plus
a risk premium that is speci￿c to that asset. In particular, since long-term government bonds
and swaps are both exposed to movements in the general level of interest rates, the impact of
MBS duration on the overall term premium is independent of the fraction of MBS hedged with
government bonds and swaps￿ just as in the simpler model developed above.
However, MBS hedging ￿ ows now have an impact on the spread between long-term ￿xed
income assets. For instance, the government-speci￿c risk premium is high when MBS duration is
high: since MBS investors hedge with government bonds, the government-speci￿c risk premium
must rise to induce arbitrageurs to hold more Treasuries. Since these hedging ￿ ows have no
impact on the corporate-speci￿c risk premium, they result in tighter than normal spreads between
long-term corporate and government bonds. Furthermore, if a su¢ ciently large volume of MBS
hedging takes place in swap markets, and the idiosyncratic movements in swaps are large relative
to the idiosyncratic movements in Treasuries, we would also expect an increase in MBS duration
to raise the spread between swaps and Treasuries.
In summary, the analysis predicts that a high level of MBS duration should: (i) be associated
with narrow current spreads between corporate bonds and duration-matched Treasuries; (ii)
predict a future widening of spreads between corporate bonds and duration-matched Treasuries;
and (iii) predict that the future returns on corporate bonds will underperform those on duration-
matched Treasuries. And since swaps are used to hedge MBS, each of these predictions should
be reversed for swaps.
I ￿nd evidence consistent with each of these additional predictions in Table 10. In Panel A,
I report regressions of the form
￿SPREADt = a1 + b1 ￿ ￿DUR_CNTRB
MBS
t + c
0
1￿xt + vt: (20)
Speci￿cally, I regress 3-month changes in spreads on the contemporaneous change in MBS dura-
tion contribution and controls. I ￿nd that increases in MBS duration are associated with tighter
spreads between corporate bonds and Treasuries and with wider swap spreads. This holds in
univariate regressions as well as in multivariate regressions that control for changes in the term
spread, the VIX, and the past returns on the stock market, which Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein,
and Martin (2001) show are useful for explaining changes in corporate credit spreads. Spreads
are in percentage points, so the coe¢ cient of ￿0:43 in column (1) suggests that a 1-year rise in
DUR_CNTRBMBS
t is associated with a 43 bps decline in investment grade spreads. Based on
the univariate estimates, a one standard deviation change in DUR_CNTRBMBS
t is associated
with a 11 bps decline in all investment grade corporate spreads, a 4 bps decline in Aaa spreads,
30a 19 bps decline in Baa spreads, and a 3 bps rise in 10-year swap spreads.
In Panel B, I use the level of MBS duration to forecast spread changes over the next 12-months
￿SPREADt+1 = a2 + b2 ￿ DUR_CNTRB
MBS
t + c
0
2xt + ut+1: (21)
I ￿nd that a high level of MBS duration predicts that corporate spreads will widen over the next
12-months and that swap spread spreads will tighten. Again, this holds true in both univariate
forecasting regressions as well as in multivariate regressions that control for the initial level of
spreads and other conditioning variables.
Finally, I forecast the excess returns on corporate bonds and swaps over duration-matched
Treasuries over the following 12-months
rx
DUR￿MATCH
t+1 = a3 + b3 ￿ DUR_CNTRB
MBS
t + c
0
3xt + "t+1: (22)
By construction, these regressions provide almost identical information to those in Panel B.
Speci￿cally, a high level of MBS duration predicts that the returns on long-term corporate bonds
will underperform those on duration-matched Treasuries, while swaps are expected to outperform
duration-matched Treasuries.
Finally, Perli and Sack (2003), Wooldridge (2001), and Reinhart and Sack (2000), argue that
many MBS investors switched from hedging with Treasuries to hedging with interest rate swaps
beginning in the late 1990s. Several episodes, including the ￿ ight-to-quality dislocations in the
fall of 1998 and the jump in the convenience premium on Treasuries following the Treasury buy-
back announcement in early 2000, convinced many MBS investors that hedging with Treasuries
exposed them to far greater basis risk than hedging with swaps. Interestingly, the time-series
evidence is consistent with such a shift in hedging activity: in untabulated results, I ￿nd that
the tendency for swap spreads to widen when MBS duration rises became signi￿cantly more
pronounced after 1997.
In summary, the evidence is consistent with previous work, including Cortes (2003 and 2006)
and Feldhutter and Lando (2008), which argues that MBS hedging plays a signi￿cant role in
explaining the level of US swap spreads. And this spread-based evidence supports the broader
argument of this paper: shifts in MBS duration and the associated hedging ￿ ows function as
large-scale supply shocks that have signi￿cant e⁄ects on bond market pricing.
4 Conclusion
Changes in the e⁄ective duration of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) function as large-scale
duration supply shocks in US bond markets. As a result, bond term premia are high when
aggregate MBS duration is high; and changes in MBS duration capture variation in bond risk
premia that is not re￿ ected in traditional forecasting variables. The fact that these recurring and
transient supply shocks have large e⁄ects on bond prices highlights the critical role of limited
and slow-moving arbitrage capital, even in markets as deep and liquid as the US bond market.
31The negative convexity of MBS￿ the fact that MBS duration rises when interest rates rise￿
generates a positive feedback loop that helps explain the excess sensitivity of long rates to short
rates and excess volatility of long rates. MBS convexity has the potential to amplify a variety
of shocks within US bond markets. For instance, one might expect the e⁄ective risk tolerance of
￿xed income arbitrageurs to decline following losses. If arbitrageurs are long duration and lose
money when rates rise, negative MBS convexity could add another positive feedback loop to US
bond markets. Speci￿cally, a decline in arbitrageur risk tolerance would lead to a rise in yields;
this would cause the duration of MBS to extend, raising required returns and causing yields to
rise further; the resulting losses would further lower arbitrageur risk tolerance; and so on.
Thus, MBS convexity may sometimes act as a destabilizing force within US bond markets￿ as
it arguably did at the beginning of the three most recent Fed tightening cycles in 1994, 1999;
and 2003. While it may be desirable for households to have access to mortgages that embed
a no-penalty prepayment option, this may come at some cost in terms of ￿nancial stability.
More speculatively, my analysis o⁄ers a potential explanation for the ￿nding that failures of the
expectations hypothesis are more pronounced in the US than in most other developed nations
(see e.g., Campbell (2003)). Since the US is one of the few countries with long-term ￿xed rate
mortgages that embed a true interest rate call, the existence of a signi￿cant MBS convexity e⁄ect
suggests a novel solution to this puzzle.
Finally, my analysis indicates that shocks to MBS duration impact term premia throughout
the US bond market￿ for government debt, MBS, and corporate debt alike￿ as predicted by a
model like Vayanos and Vila (2009) in the portfolio-balance tradition. This ￿nding is relevant for
the ongoing debate about the e⁄ectiveness of Quantiative Easing (QE) policies￿ the purchases of
long-term bonds by the Federal Reserve and other global central banks. For instance, Krishna-
murthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2013) have argued that the markets for MBS, corporate bonds,
and Treasuries are highly segmented from one another, so QE policies do not work through broad
channels such a shifting the market-wide price of interest rate risk. My results do not show that
QE policies have lowered the duration risk premium in bond markets. However, they do provide
something of a ￿proof of concept￿for QE policies that seek to impact market-wide term premia:
comparably-sized shocks to the quantity of duration appear to have had signi￿cant e⁄ects on
term premia in the past.
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Figure 1: Effective duration of the US fixed income market, 1989-present: Panel A plots effective duration 
measures based on Barclays bonds indices from 1989-present. Specifically, we plot the effective duration of 
the Barclays Aggregate Index (DUR
AGG), the effective duration of the Barclays MBS index (DUR
MBS), and 
the duration contribution of the MBS Index to aggregate duration (DUR_CNTRB
MBS). Panel B shows 
the decomposition from equation (19) in 12-month changes. Specifically, the change in aggregate duration 
is the sum of the MBS contribution and the non-MBS contribution. Panel C plots detrended refinancing 
activity based on the Mortgage Bankers’ Association’s Refinancing Index versus aggregate refinancing 
incentives (the average coupon on outstanding MBS minus the primary mortgage rate). Panels D shows 
detrended MBS duration in 10-year Treasury equivalents (in billions of current dollars). 
 
Panel A: Effective duration in levels 
 
Panel B: 12-month changes in effective duration 
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Figure 1: Effective duration of the US fixed income market (continued) 
 
Panel C: Refinancing activity and refinancing incentives 
 
Panel D: Detrended Duration in 10-year US Treasury Equivalents (in billions of current $) 
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Figure 2: Basic forecasting result using MBS duration contribution: This is a graphical depiction of the 
forecasting regression of future 10-year excess returns on the term spread and    _      
   , 
corresponding to column (10) of Table 2. Specifically, Panel A shows a scatter plot of the component of 
future 12-month excess returns that is orthogonal to the term spread  versus the component of 
   _      
    that is orthogonal to the term spread. Panel B shows the corresponding time-series plot. 
 
Panel A: Scatter plot 
 
Panel B: Time-series plot 
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Figure 3: Coefficients by quarterly forecast horizons. This figure plots the coefficients b(j) on the duration 
contribution of the MBS Index from estimating 
(10) (10)
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jj t j t rx a b DUR CNTRB 
         c x  
for quarters j = 1, ..., 8, effectively tracing out a nonparametric version of the “impulse” to quarterly 
excess bond returns following a movement in MBS duration. Panel A plots the coefficients from 
univariate forecasting regressions. The multivariate specifications in Panel B controls for the term spread. 
Confidence intervals, based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors allowing for serial correlation at up to 
6 months, are shown as dashed lines. 
 
Panel A: Univariate coefficients by quarterly forecast horizon 
 
 
Panel B: Multivariate coefficients by quarterly forecast horizon 
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Figure 4: Impulse response of quarterly excess bond returns to an MBS duration shock. Using quarterly 
data, I estimate a first order VAR of the form 
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For simplicity, I show results only for DUR = DUR_CNTRB
MBS.  Below I plot the (simple) impulse 
response from a shock to DUR_CNTRB
MBS in quarter t = 0 on 10-year excess returns from quarters t = 
1, ..., 8. Confidence intervals for the estimated impulse response are shown in gray. For simplicity, I use a 
a quarterly data set of non-overlapping observations samples in March, June, September, and December. 
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Figure 5: Excess return, yield, and forward rate forecasting coefficients by bond maturity. This figure plots the coefficients b(n) from estimating
() ()
11 () ()
nn
tt nn t rx a b DUR 
     
versus maturity n, for n = 2,...,20. I then plot the coefficients b(n) versus maturity n  from estimating 
() () ()
11
() () ()
11
() ()
() () ,
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ff
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
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for n = 0, 1, 2,...,20. For simplicy, I rescale the coefficients b(n) so that they reflect the impact of one standard deviation shift in DURt. Confidence 
intervals, based on Newey-West (1987) SEs allowing for serial correlation at up to 18 months, are shown as dashed lines. Panel A shows results for 
MBS duration, and Panel B shows results for MBS duration contribution. In each panel, the left-most plot shows the excess return forecasting results 
by maturity, the middle plot shows yield-change forecasting results by maturity, and the right-most plot shows forward-change forecasting results. 
Panel A: MBS duration 
Panel B: MBS duration contribution 
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Figure 6: Growth of MBS market and MBS duration measures, 1976-present. Panel A shows the market 
value of the Barclays MBS index as a fraction of the market value of the Barclays Aggregate Index (a 
common proxy for broader the investment grade bond market) and as a fraction of the sum of the value 
of Barclay’s MBS and Treasury indices. Panel B compares the evolution of the effective duration of the 
MBS index from 1989-present to the Macaulay duration-to-worst of the MBS index from 1976-present. 
Panel A: The growth of the MBS market 
  
Panel B: MBS duration measures 
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Figure 7: Coefficients from 60-month rolling excess return forecasting regressions, 1976-present. This 
presents results from 60-month (20-quarter) rolling regressions of 3-month excess returns on MBS 
duration measures, controlling for the term spread 
(10) (10) (1) (10)
1/4 1/4 ()  .
tt t t t rx a b dur cy y 
      
Panel A shows results for MBS Macaulay duration (dur  =  dur
MBS), Panel B shows results for MBS 
Macaulay duration contribution (dur  =  dur_cntrb
MB), and Panel C shows results for aggregate 
refinancing incentives (dur = c - yM). The left-hand plot in each Panel shows the estimated regression 
coefficients on dur along with confidence intervals as dashed lines. The right-hand plot shows the 
associated t-statistics. I compute standard errors using Newey-West (1987) standard errors allowing for 
serial correlation at up to 6 months. 
 
Panel A: MBS Macaulay duration (dur = dur
MBS)
Panel B: MBS Macaulay duration contribution (dur = dur_cntrb
MB)
Panel C: Aggregate refinancing incentives (dur = c - yM)
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Table 1: Summary statistics: This table presents means, medians, standard deviations, extreme values, 
and monthly time-series autocorrelations (denoted ) of variables between 1989:m1 and 2011:m4. Panel A 
present summary statistics for US Treasury excess returns, yield spreads, and forwards from Gürkaynak, 
Sack, and Wright (2007). These variables are all measured in percentage points. Panel B presents 
summary statistics for various measures of effective duration in years based on Barclays Capital bond 
indices. Panel C reports the corresponding summary statistics for effective convexity. The effective 
convexity measures are only available beginning in 1997:m4. 
 
  N Mean Median SD Min Max  ρ 
Panel A: US Treasury excess returns, yield spreads, and forwards (%) 
     
      268 3.00 3.33 4.39 -8.49 12.46 0.922
     
      268 4.98 5.74 7.73 -16.41 20.96 0.884
     
      268 6.32 6.35 12.98 -29.35 39.17 0.861
  
        
     268 0.90 0.76 0.83 -0.54 2.50  0.973
  
         
     268 1.57 1.20 1.28 -0.58 3.79  0.977
  
         
     268 2.01 1.57 1.54 -0.82 4.68  0.978
   
     268 4.45 4.59 2.24 0.16 9.70  0.976
   
     268 4.93 4.98 2.01 0.62 9.32  0.971
   
     268 5.33 5.35 1.80 1.42 9.19  0.970
   
     268 5.67 5.60 1.64 2.31 9.17  0.970
   
     268 5.96 5.76 1.52 3.02 9.16  0.969
Panel B: Effective Duration (years) 
    
     268 4.53 4.56 0.26 3.71 5.12  0.863
    
     268 3.35 3.49 0.91 0.58 4.83  0.875
   _      
     268 1.08 1.12 0.29 0.20 1.78  0.851
    
     268 5.13 5.16 0.25 4.47 5.61  0.954
   _      
     268 3.46 3.45 0.18 2.93 3.88  0.960
   
   /   
     268 0.33 0.33 0.04 0.26 0.41  0.991
Panel C: Effective Convexity (years) 
     
     169 -0.18 -0.19 0.17 -0.52 0.20  0.844
     
     169 -1.50 -1.54 0.45 -2.43 -0.44 0.825
     
    ∙       
   /   
      169 -0.52 -0.54 0.16 -0.85 -0.15 0.81845 
 
Table 2: Forecasting 10-year excess nominal bond returns, 1989-Present: Regressions of 12-month excess returns on 10-year Treasuries on the effective 
duration of the Aggregate Index, the effective duration of the MBS Index, and the effective duration contribution of the MBS index 
(10) (10)
11 .
tt tt rx a b DUR 
    cx  
The regressions are estimated with monthly data, so each month I am forecasting the excess return over the following 12 months. To deal with the 
overlapping nature of returns, t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors allowing for serial correlation at up to 18 lags. I estimate 
these regressions with and without other forecasting variables identified in the literature on bond risk premia. Specifically, I control for the term spread 
following Campbell and Shiller (1991) and the first five forward rates following Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005).  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
    
        6.725  11.482  7.749       
   [2.84] [5.44] [2.73]  
    
              2.905 4.437 3.929     
   [2.76]  [6.48] [4.59]
   _      
              11.253  14.629  12.143
     [3.70] [5.78] [4.44]
  
         
     2.178    2.928    3.231    2.999  
  [3.02] [3.88]   [4.67] [4.57]
   
       -37.854    -30.755    -27.953    -22.653 
   [-6.77] [-4.91]   [-4.59] [-3.89]
   
       217.606    171.892    146.201    114.797 
   [7.00] [4.77]   [4.68] [3.78]
   
       -511.359    -403.066    -340.160    -268.889 
   [-6.92] [-4.80]   [-4.74] [-3.78]
   
       533.181    418.391    357.217    286.175 
   [6.66] [4.72]   [4.60] [3.65]
   
       -201.349    -156.236    -136.066    -109.305 
   [-6.26] [-4.47]   [-4.29] [-3.36]
Constant  1.555 2.065  -25.513  -51.686  -34.283  -4.740  -14.948 -6.634 -7.158  -15.515  -11.768 
  [1.04] [0.48] [-2.34] [-5.08] [-2.56] [-1.18]  [-4.58] [-1.27] [-1.85] [-4.23] [-1.95]
Observations  268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 
R-squared  0.13 0.31 0.05 0.26 0.35 0.12 0.37 0.42 0.17 0.40 0.46 
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Table 3: Forecasting 10-year excess nominal bond returns, MBS vs. non-MBS duration: Regressions of 12-month excess returns on 10-year Treasuries 
on the effective duration of the Aggregate Index, the effective duration contribution of the MBS Index, and the effective duration contribution of the 
non-MBS index 
(10) (10)
11 .
tt tt rx a b DUR 
    cx  
The regressions are estimated with monthly data, so each month I am forecasting the excess return over the following 12 months. To deal with the 
overlapping nature of returns, t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors allowing for serial correlation at up to 18 lags. I estimate 
these regressions with and without other forecasting variables identified in the literature on bond risk premia. Specifically, I control for the term spread 
following Campbell and Shiller (1991) and the first five forward rates following Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005). 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
    
     6.725     11.482     7.749   
  [2.84] [5.44]   [2.73]
   _      
      11.253    8.872   14.629   13.586   12.143   10.178
   [3.70] [3.25] [5.78]  [6.63] [4.44] [3.48]
   _      
        -14.620  -8.022    -13.676  -3.179    -13.200  -5.577
   [-2.10] [-1.11] [-1.92]  [-0.44] [-1.73] [-0.68]
  
         
          2.928  2.999  2.053  2.912     
   [3.88] [4.57] [2.74]  [4.14]
   
              -30.755  -22.653  -33.422  -23.239 
     [-4.91] [-3.89] [-5.39] [-4.00]
   
              171.892  114.797  183.721  117.115 
     [4.77] [3.78] [5.04] [3.86]
   
              -403.066  -268.889  -432.257  -274.699 
     [-4.80] [-3.78] [-4.87] [-3.96]
   
              418.391  286.175  460.215  295.311 
     [4.72] [3.65] [4.87] [3.99]
   
              -156.236  -109.305  -178.142  -114.393 
     [-4.47] [-3.36] [-4.85] [-3.82]
Constant -25.513  -7.158  55.500  23.133  -51.686  -15.515 49.011 -3.268  -34.283  -11.768 48.946 10.278 
 [-2.34] [-1.85] [2.31] [0.88] [-5.08] [-4.23] [1.98] [-0.12] [-.56] [-1.95] [1.92] [0.34]
Observations  268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 
R-squared  0.05 0.17 0.12 0.20 0.26 0.40 0.23 0.41 0.35 0.46 0.39 0.47 
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Table 4: Comparison with literature on the Federal Reserve’s Large Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) programs. This table compares the implied price-
impact from my regressions using MBS duration with that estimated by papers examining the Fed’s LSAP programs. I obtain the implied effect for 
each LSAP as: 
Implied	Effect	in	bps    Effect	of	1	σ	move	in	    	on	     	in	bps   
LSAP	size	in	10yr	UST	duration	equivalents $b 
10yr	UST	duration	equivalents $b 	corresponding	to	1	σ	move	in	    	
 
 
   Estimated effect on 10-year yield (bps)
   LSAP evaluation studies Effect Implied by MBS Supply Shocks
 Event  Supply  shock  ($b) Average Min Max     
        _      
    
  Description  10-yr UST dur equiv. study study  study Uni Multi Uni Multi 
LSAP1
a  Purchase of $300b Treasuries, 
$200b agencies, $1,250b MBS 
announced from 11/2008 - 3/2009. 
7 5 0 8 35 5  1 0 75 46 86 97 9  
LSAP2
b  Purchase of $600b of long-term 
Treasuries announced in 11/2010 
400 24 15 30 29 36 37 42 
LSAP3
c  Announced 9/2011: Buy $400b LT 
USTs and sell $400b ST USTs 
400 21 17 25 29 36 37 42 
  Effect of 1- move in DURt on 10-year yields (bps):   36 46 40 46 
  10-year UST equiv ($b) corresponding to 1- move in DURt   503 503 436 436 
 
                                                 
a Li and Wei (2013) estimate that the $300 billion of Treasury purchases associated with LSAP1 reduced duration supply by $169 =  4.5   300 /8 billion 10-year 
Treasury equivalents. Thus, accounting for the purchases of $200 billion of agency debt and $1,250 billion MBS, I estimate that LSAP1 reduced the aggregate supply of 
duration by $750	  	 4.5   300   4.5   200   3   1250 /8 billion 10-year Treasury equivalents. Gagnon et al (2011) examine movements in yields on eight LSAP1 
announcement dates and estimate that LSAP1 reduced 10-year yields by 91 bps. Applying the coefficients from time-series regressions, Gagnon et al estimate an impact 
of LSAP1 of 61 bps. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) examine movement in yields on five LSAP1 announcement dates and estimate that LSAP1 reduced 
10-year yields by 107 bps. Using a no arbitrage model, Li and Wei (2013) estimate that LSAP1 lowered yields by 99 bps. Jarrow and Li (2012) also estimate a no 
arbitrage model and estimate that LSAP1 and LSAP2 lowered 10-year yields by 70 bps. Assuming roughly 80% of this corresponds to LSAP1, this implies that LSAP1 
lowered yields by 56 bps. 
b Li and Wei (2013) estimate that LSAP2 reduced the supply of duration by $400 billion 10-year Treasury equivalents. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) 
examine movement in yields on three LSAP2 announcement dates and estimate that LSAP2 reduced 10-year yields by 30 bps. Using a no arbitrage model, Li and Wei 
(2013) estimate that LSAP2 lowered yields by 26 bps. Jarrow and Li (2012) also estimate a no arbitrage model and estimate that LSAP1 and LSAP2 lowered 10-year 
yields by 70 bps. Assuming roughly 20% of Jarrow and Li’s (2012) estimate corresponds to LSAP2, this implies that LSAP2 lowered yields by 14 bps. 
c LSAP3 is often referred to as the “Maturity Extension Program” or MEP. Li and Wei (2013) estimate that LSAP3 reduced the supply of duration by $400 billion 10-year 
Treasury equivalents. Li and Wei (2013) estimate that LSAP3 lowered 10-year yields by 25 basis points. Using regressions similar to those in Greenwood and Vayanos 
(2013), Hamilton and Wu (2012) estimate that LSAP3 lowered 10-year yields by 17 bps.  48 
 
Table 5: Horseraces between MBS duration and mortgage refinancing measures: Regressions of 12-month excess returns on 10-year nominal 
Treasuries on the effective duration contribution of the MBS index and either (i) aggregate refinancing incentives (       , ) computed as the 
difference between the average MBS coupon and the Freddie Mac primary market 30-year mortgage rate or (ii) the log-deviation of the MBA 
mortgage refinancing index from its Hodrick-Prescott (1997) trend (     ): 
(10) (10)
1 1 _.
t t
MBS
tt t rx a b DUR CNTRB c REFI 
       dx  
The regressions are estimated with monthly data, so each month I am forecasting the excess return over the following 12 months. To deal with the 
overlapping nature of returns, t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors allowing for serial correlation at up to 18 lags. I 
estimate these regressions with and without other forecasting variables identified in the literature on bond risk premia. Specifically, I control for 
the term spread following Campbell and Shiller (1991) and the first five forward rates following Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005). 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
       ,   -2.571 -7.766 -6.867  2.444 -4.702 -5.158           
  [-1.26] [-4.46] [-3.29] [0.72] [-1.44] [-1.51]  
              -4.670  -6.772  -6.027  -2.264  -4.448  -4.432
   [-3.33]  [-6.31] [-4.23] [-1.12] [-2.87] [-2.59]
   _      
           15.470 7.686 4.624       7.682 7.378 5.551
   [2.72] [1.90] [1.17]  [2.04] [2.83] [2.37]
  
         
       4.537    4.038    3.317    3.298  
   [4.70] [3.92]  [4.55] [4.65]
   
        -26.123    -23.254    -17.055    -14.383 
   [-3.53] [-3.91]   [2.27] [-1.95]
   
        131.748    113.968    94.061    74.597 
   [3.09] [3.50]  [2.43] [2.03]
   
        -318.861    -274.439    -246.166    -196.714 
   [-3.34] [-3.78]   [2.85] [-2.42]
   
        347.721    299.820    281.555    228.361 
   [3.59] [4.00]  [3.13] [2.66]
   
        -134.407    -116.017    -112.104    -91.553 
   [-3.61] [-3.89]   [3.15] [-2.64]
Constant 4.303  -4.202  -1.734  -11.061  -10.900  -6.056  5.273 -0.210  0.632 -2.978 -8.102 -5.626 
 [2.73]  [-1.87] [-0.32] [-1.94] [-3.12] [-1.13] [4.17] [0.13] [0.13] [0.73] [2.27] [-0.95]
Observations  268 268 268 268 268 268 256 256 256 256 256 256 
R-squared  0.05 0.42 0.50 0.19 0.45 0.51 0.17 0.42 0.51 0.21 0.46 0.52 
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Table 6: Forecasting 12-month ahead 10-year excess nominal bond returns, subsample results: 1976-
present: Regressions of 12-month excess returns on 10-year Treasuries on the effective duration of the 
MBS Index, the effective duration contribution of the MBS index, and aggregate refinancing incentives 
(10) (10)
11  .
tt tt rx a b DUR 
    cx  
For MBS duration,     
   (effective) refers to option-adjusted effective duration which is available from 
1989-present.     
   (Macaulay) refers to Macaulay duration-to-worst which is available from 1976-present. 
A similar notation applies in the case of MBS duration contribution. The regressions are estimated with 
monthly data, so each month I am forecasting the excess return over the following 12 months. To deal 
with the overlapping nature of returns, t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors 
allowing for serial correlation at up to 18 lags. I estimate these regressions with and without controlling 
for the term-spreads. 
 
Panel A: Subsample results for MBS duration 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8)
  1989+  1989-1999  2000+  1989+  1976+  1976-1988  1989-1999  2000+ 
    
    (effective)  4.437  5.324  4.355      
  [6.48] [3.33] [9.44]  
    
    (Macaulay)       5.968 1.505  -0.962  10.198 4.383 
   [4.57] [0.76] [-0.27]  [3.05] [5.14]
  
         
     3.231 3.062 2.938 2.935 3.481 4.516 3.278 2.333 
  [4.67] [1.93] [4.30] [4.23] [3.34] [1.76] [2.44] [2.92]
Constant -14.948  -19.279  -12.830  -27.100 -8.601  2.063  -48.689  -17.803 
 [-4.58] [-2.65] [-4.73] [-4.08] [-0.93] [0.11] [-2.99] [-4.01]
Observations  268 132 136 268 424 156 132 136 
R-squared 0.37  0.34  0.49  0.34 0.15 0.13 0.41 0.37 
Panel B: Subsample results for MBS duration contribution 
  1989+  1989-1999  2000+  1989+  1976+  1976-1988  1989-1999  2000+ 
   _      
     effective   14.629  19.993  11.886      
  [5.78] [3.86] [8.64]  
   _      
    (Macaulay)        14.551 6.733 9.220  33.513  11.891 
   [3.80] [2.18] [1.71]  [2.96] [5.76]
  
         
     2.999 3.004 2.837 2.319 2.579 3.756 3.140 2.218 
  [4.57] [1.98] [4.07] [3.52] [2.64] [1.58] [2.84] [2.89]
Constant  -15.515 -21.018 -12.307 -20.371 -8.244 -9.578  -46.573  -16.979 
 [-4.23] [-3.04] [-4.42] [-3.39] [-1.63] [-1.84] [-3.07] [-4.22]
Observations  268 132 136 268 424 156 132 136 
R-squared  0.40 0.38 0.47 0.32 0.20 0.15 0.42 0.36 
Panel C: Subsample results for mortgage refinancing incentive (       , ) 
   1989+  1976+  1976-1988  1989-1999  2000+ 
       ,        -7.766 -1.684 -3.455 -9.119 -6.717 
   [-4.46] [-1.50] [-2.91]  [-4.24] [-3.78]
  
         
          4.537 4.531 8.205 6.066 3.828 
   [4.70] [3.94] [3.87]  [3.54] [4.14]
Constant       -4.202 -4.479  -15.428 -5.710 -3.209 
   [-1.87] [-1.79] [-5.32]  [-1.70] [-1.21]
Observations       268 424 156 132 136 
R-squared       0.42 0.19 0.30 0.48 0.33 
 50 
 
Table 7: Using US MBS duration to forecast foreign bond excess returns, 1989-Present. This tables presents univariate forecasting regressions of the form 
() ()
,1 ,1 ,
FOR n FOR n
ct t ct rx a b DUR     and multivariate regressions of the form
() () ( 1 ) () ( 1 ) ()
,1 , , ,1 (( )) .
FOR n US n US FOR n FOR FOR n
ct t ct t ct t ct rx a b y y y y DUR c d            Using IFS data on 
long-term government bond yields and short-term interest rates, I compute foreign government bond returns for the ten developed countries: Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Since the long-term yields are for coupon-bearing bonds, I follow Campbell (1999, 
2003) and use the Campbell, Shiller, and Schoenholtz (1983) approximation to compute excess returns over short-term government bills (when available) or money 
market rates (when bills are not available). To deal with the overlapping nature of the regressions, t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors 
allowing for serial correlation at up to 18 lags. To assess the differential forecasting power between foreign bond and domestic bond excess returns, for each country 
I rerun the regressions with    ,  1
      
      ,  1
     
 on the left-hand-side. I then report the coefficient on DURt from this specification as well as the associated t-statistic, 
labeled as “Diff from USA” below. Panel A shows results for     
    and Panel B shows results for    _      
   . 
 
Panel A: Forecasting foreign bond excess returns using     
    
  USA  BEL  CAN  DEN  FRA  GER  ITA  JPN  SWE  SUI  UK 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
          
    
     2.42 2.91 0.44 0.77 0.69 1.90 0.83 1.06 0.21 0.74 0.20 0.58  -0.44  -0.18 1.51 2.13 1.03 1.41  -0.14 1.37 0.92 1.50 
  [3.53]  [5.81]  [0.52]  [1.44]  [0.86] [4.36] [1.19] [1.78] [0.31] [1.59] [0.23] [0.88]  [-0.56] [-0.20] [1.21] [2.49] [1.07] [1.73] [-0.15] [2.85] [0.99] [1.99] 
  
          
        1.94   1.37   0.56   1.63   1.52   1.93   1.04   2.10   1.38   2.12   1.49 
   [3.13]   [1.80]  [0.88] [2.28] [2.00] [2.75]  [0.86] [2.74] [1.56] [3.19] [2.12] 
  
           
            1.74   1.79   1.35   1.05   1.84   -1.03   2.15   1.39   1.80   0.79 
       [2.21]  [2.58] [2.29] [1.53] [2.51]  [0.79] [0.98] [1.95] [3.31] [1.18] 
Constant  -4.64 -9.62  1.11 -4.82  1.19 -6.63  0.00 -4.59  1.81 -3.60  1.83 -4.82  4.05  2.52 -2.75  -10.59 -0.09 -5.18  2.73 -7.72 -0.53 -5.45 
  [-1.74]  [-3.80]  [0.40]  [-2.16]  [0.48] [-4.17] [0.00] [-1.82] [0.80] [-1.62] [0.69] [-2.00]  [1.58] [0.71] [-0.78] [-3.95] [-0.03] [-1.84] [0.98] [-3.88] [-0.19] [-1.77] 
Observations  268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 
R-squared  0.14 0.29 0.00 0.26 0.02 0.39 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.25 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.37 0.02 0.22 
Diff  from  USA     -1.98 -2.10 -1.72 -1.07 -1.59 -1.79 -2.21 -2.22 -2.22 -2.30 -2.86 -3.12 -0.91 -0.79 -1.39 -1.51 -2.56 -1.74 -1.50 -1.40 
    [-3.73]  [-4.88]  [-3.73] [-2.66] [-3.35] [-3.40] [-4.65] [-4.98] [-3.70] [-4.28]  [-3.09] [-3.46] [-0.87] [-0.88] [-1.93] [-2.13] [-3.30] [-2.78] [-1.85] [-1.89] 
         
Panel B: Forecasting foreign bond excess returns using    _      
    
  USA  BEL  CAN  DEN  FRA  GER  ITA  JPN  SWE  SUI  UK 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
          
   _      
     8.76  10.05 2.14 2.27 2.82 5.31 3.53 3.61 1.88 2.56 2.69 3.22  -2.14  -1.10 5.57 6.32 4.31 4.49 2.15 4.46 4.07 5.39 
  [4.31]  [5.70]  [0.98]  [1.44]  [1.45] [4.00] [1.45] [2.03] [0.96] [1.50] [1.34] [1.78]  [-0.94] [-0.44] [2.77] [2.84] [1.69] [1.86] [1.10] [-3.05] [1.76] [2.37] 
  
          
        1.90   1.36   0.69   1.61   1.52   1.97   1.01   2.01   1.36   2.13   1.55 
   [3.43]   [1.74]  [0.89] [2.29] [1.98] [2.76]  [0.83] [2.53] [1.52] [3.17] [1.96] 
  
           
            1.70   1.57   1.31   0.96   1.78   -0.98   1.58   1.27   1.61   0.71 
       [2.07]  [2.12] [2.12] [1.35] [2.36]  [-0.75] [0.69] [1.66] [3.01] [1.06] 
Constant  -6.01  -10.66  0.26 -4.58  0.47 -5.88 -1.05 -4.86  0.47 -3.81 -0.41 -6.34  4.89  3.12 -3.70 -9.53 -1.30 -5.15 -0.06 -7.77 -1.84 -6.30 
  [-2.28]  [-4.05]  [0.10]  [-1.82]  [0.22] [-3.27] [-0.35] [-1.83] [0.19] [-1.35] [-0.18] [-2.35]  [1.58] [0.75] [-1.79] [-3.03] [-0.41] [-1.45] [0.03] [-3.84] [-0.75] [-1.83] 
Observations  268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 
R-squared  0.19 0.33 0.01 0.26 0.03 0.37 0.02 0.22 0.01 0.17 0.02 0.32 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.23 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.38 0.04 0.23 
Diff  from  USA     -6.63 -7.48 -5.94 -4.66 -5.23 -6.19 -6.88 -7.42 -6.07 -6.69  -10.91  -11.57 -3.20 -3.96 -4.45 -5.70 -6.61 -5.56 -4.70 -4.72 
    [-5.29]  [-5.17]  [-5.57] [-4.81] [-4.06] [-3.92] [-5.38] [-4.80] [-4.70] [-4.09]  [-3.88] [-3.65] [-1.33] [-1.46] [-3.04] [-2.99] [4.06] [3.12] [2.30] [-2.26] 
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Table 8: Response of US long-term forwards to changes in short-term rates, 1999-present. Daily 
regressions of changes in nominal and real forward rates on short-term nominal rates, allowing for a 
differential response depending on MBS negative convexity. MBS negative convexity is simply negative 
one times MBS convexity. Specifically, I estimate 
$(2) $(2) (10) (10) ( ),
tt
X X
t t
MBS MBS
tt yy f a b c NCONV d NCONV             
and 
$(2) $(2) (10) (10) ( ),
tt
X X
t t
MBS MBS
tt ff fa b c N C O N V d N C O N V             
for  X = $ and TIPS.  t-statistics, based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors allowing for serial 
correlation at a lag of up to 20 business days, are shown in brackets.  
 
  $ TIPS $ TIPS $ TIPS  $ TIPS
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
y
$(2)  0.322 0.124 0.475 0.142  
  [2.67] [1.86] [3.99] [1.98]  
f
$(2)  0.264 0.074 0.364 0.084
  [3.33] [1.41] [4.97] [1.66]
NCONVMBS  0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
  [0.06] [-0.58] [0.13] [-0.65] 
NCONV
MBS ∙ (MV
MBS/MV
AGG)  0.002 0.000  0.001 -0.001
  [0.23] [0.06]  [0.09] [-0.16]
y
$(2)×NCONV
MBS  0.140 0.114  
  [1.74] [2.51]  
y
$(2)×NCONV
MBS ∙ (MV
MBS/MV
AGG)
  0.107 0.278  
  [0.48] [1.96]  
f
 $(2)×NCONV
MBS  0.155 0.135 
  [2.94] [4.00] 
f
 $(2)×NCONV
MBS ∙ (MV
MBS/MV
AGG)   0.247 0.354
  [1.77] [3.74]
Constant 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000  -0.001 0.000
 [0.01] [0.19] [-0.27] [-0.28] [0.02] [0.19]  [-0.16] [0.26]
R-squared 0.21 0.12 0.21 0.12 0.31 0.19  0.31 0.19
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Table 9: Implied variance of US long-term yields and MBS convexity, 1997-present. Weekly regressions of 
swaption-implied yield variance on MBS negative convexity: 
2( 1 0 ) 2 ( 1 0 ) ( 1 0 )
11 1 (( )) .
MBS
tt t t t y a b y c y d NCONV u            
MBS negative convexity is simply negative one times MBS convexity. I follow the empirical approach of 
Perli and Sack (2003) as outlined in the main text. Specifically, the left-hand side variable,     
  Δ      ,	 is 
the residual from a regression of 10-year by 3-month forward swaption-implied variance (the square of 
implied volatility) on 10-year by 2-year forward implied yield variance. t-statistics, based on Newey-West 
(1987) standard errors allowing for serial correlation at a lag of up to 12 weeks, are shown in brackets. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
      
   Δ      ,	   0.941 0.941 0.939 0.939
  [49.81] [50.40] [49.61] [49.86]
    
      0.004  0.006
  [1.07]  [1.64]
        
     0.013 0.020  
  [2.14] [2.29]  
        
   	∙	      
   /     
    
  0.048 0.078
  [2.14] [2.70]
Constant -0.021 -0.051 -0.026  -0.072
 [-2.28] [-1.62] [-2.42] [-2.31]
Observations  785 785 785 785
R-squared  0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
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Table 10: The impact on MBS duration on corporate bond and swap spreads, 1990-Present: Panel A shows 
regressions of 3-month changes in spreads over Treasuries on contemporaneous 3-month changes in MBS duration: 
11 1  _.
MBS
tt t t SPREAD a b v DUR CNTRB        cx  
Panel B uses the current level of MBS duration to forecast changes in spreads over the next 12 months: 
12 2 2 1 _.
MBS
tt t t SPREAD a b u DUR CNTRB        cx  
Panel C uses the current level of MBS duration to forecast excess returns over duration-matched Treasuries over 
the following 12 months:  
13 3 3 1 _
DUR MATCH MBS
tt t t rx a b DUR CNTRB 

     cx  
To deal with the overlapping nature of the regressions, t-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors 
allowing for serial correlation at up to 6 lags in Panel A and up to 18 lags in Panels B and C. In Panel A, I control 
for changes in the term spread, the VIX, and the past returns on the stock market, all of which Collin-Dufresne, 
Goldstein, and Martin (2001) show are useful for explaining changes in corporate credit spreads. In Panel B and C, 
I control for the initial level of the term spread, the VIX, and the initial level of the spread for the each asset. 
Corporate bond spreads in Panel A and B for investment grade corporates, Aaa-rated corporates, and Baa-rated 
are the (option-adjusted) spreads on Barclays indices over duration-matched Treasuries. The 10-year swap spread 
is from Bloomberg. The returns in Panel C are the excess returns on these indices over duration-matched 
Treasuries. For swaps, I do not have an exact measure of excess returns over duration-matched Treasuries. Thus, I 
use the Campbell, Shiller, and Schoenholtz (1983) approximation. I compute this excess return using the yield on 
10-year swaps and the 10-year par Treasury yield from Gurknayak, Sack, and Wright (2007). 
 
 
  IG corporate spread  Aaa corporate spread  Baa corporate spread  10-yr swap spread 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: Contemporaneous 3-month changes in spreads over duration-matched Treasuries 
Δ   _      
     -0.43 -0.16 -0.14 0.04 -0.72 -0.35  0.13 0.17
  [-3.56] [-2.21] [-1.92] [0.50] [-3.52] [-2.75]  [3.40] [5.22]
Δ   
         
       0.05  0.04 0.06  -0.08
   [0.52]  [0.46] [0.48]  [-2.98]
Δ       0.03  0.03 0.03  0.00
   [2.78]  [2.40] [2.70]  [1.98]
         -0.01  0.00 -0.02  0.00
   [-2.40]  [1.14] [-3.84]  [1.21]
Constant  0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04  -0.01 -0.01
 [0.19] [0.79] [0.06] [0.17] [0.13] [0.94]  [-0.97] [-1.10]
Observations  265 265 265 265 265 265 265 265
R-squared  0.06 0.51 0.01 0.32 0.10 0.50 0.09 0.22
bps effect 1-DUR  -11.2 -4.0 -3.5 0.9 -18.8 -9.0  3.3 4.3
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Table 10: The impact on MBS duration on corporate bond and swap spreads, 1990-Present (continued): 
  IG corporate spread  Aaa corporate spread  Baa corporate spread  10-yr swap spread 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel B: Forecasting future 12-month changes in spreads over duration-matched Treasuries 
   _      
     0.85 0.63 0.31 0.30 1.18 0.92  -0.17 -0.16
  [2.68] [3.72] [1.46] [2.81] [2.93] [4.07]  [-2.00] [-2.87]
  
         
      -0.12  -0.08 -0.11  -0.09
   [-1.44]  [-1.65] [-1.23]  [-4.32]
       0.00  0.01 0.01  0.00
   [0.15]  [0.81] [0.76]  [0.44]
          -0.47  -0.82 -0.61  -0.47
   [-1.89]  [-4.53] [-2.88]  [-4.29]
Constant  -0.87 0.24  -0.33 0.34 -1.24 0.04 0.15 0.56
  [-2.52] [0.68]  [-1.70] [1.64] [-2.61] [0.11] [1.55] [4.25]
Observations  256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256
R-squared  0.07 0.35 0.02 0.44 0.08 0.37 0.06 0.40
bps effect 1-DUR  -24.7 -18.4  -8.9 -8.6 -34.5 -26.8  4.9 4.7
Panel C: Forecasting 12-month excess returns over duration-matched Treasuries 
 
   _      
     -4.65 -3.59 -2.28 -1.58 -6.53 -5.10  1.20 0.49
  [-2.75] [-3.87] [-1.99] [-2.31] [-3.17] [-4.66]  [2.08] [1.02]
  
         
      0.51  0.41 0.50  0.22
   [1.11]  [1.74] [1.05]  [1.91]
       0.03  0.05 -0.07  -0.01
   [0.25]  [0.87] [-0.71]  [1.01]
          2.49  0.15 3.44  3.86
   [1.74]  [0.16] [3.09]  [4.48]
Constant  5.21 -0.57  2.38 -0.11 7.37 0.29 -1.10 -2.43
  [2.82] [-0.30]  [2.41] [-0.11] [2.97] [0.13] [-2.26] [-2.52]
Observations  256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256
R-squared  0.07 0.32 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.38 0.05 0.32
 